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Abstract 
 
 In this thesis I attempt to bridge the gap between discussions of Thomas 
Jefferson’s diplomatic policy and his interactions with the Native Americans.  I argue that 
his idealism as well as his coercive tactics in foreign affairs heavily influenced his 
conduct with neighboring Indian tribes.  With European nations, Jefferson articulated his 
goals in terms of natural rights of states and an idea of universal morality.  At the same 
time, he often used seemingly Machiavellian tactics, like coercion, and threats of war to 
pursue these ends.  Jefferson’s goals in Indian affairs were very similar to those in the 
international arena.  He wanted to promote peaceful trade, and prevent war, but above all, 
acquire as much land as possible.  He pursued these aims with the same blend of moral 
justification and cunning tactics.  I will demonstrate this through analysis of Jefferson’s 
philosophical views regarding diplomacy, his ideas about Native Americans, and his role 
as president in carrying out both of these things in the real world.  This will include 
examining Jefferson’s writing about both foreign and Indian affairs, comparing treaties 
and negotiations Jefferson conducted with Europe as well as with the Native Americans, 
and his instructions to subordinates on these matters.  This thesis will contribute to the 
discussion of the presidency of Thomas Jefferson as well as the treatment of Native 
Americans in the early American Republic.   
 
 1 
Introduction 
Thomas Jefferson is an iconic figure in American history.  He is remembered as 
an idealist who challenged the established concepts about the nature of government.  He 
advocated the creation of a republic based on the ideals of the Enlightenment, and his 
ideas contributed substantially to the philosophy behind the American government.  His 
diplomatic philosophy was an extension of this concept of a new kind of state.  Jefferson 
believed that while European monarchs placed personal and national glory over the 
wellbeing of their subjects, the true purpose of foreign policy was to serve the people. He 
also extrapolated enlightenment ideals of natural rights onto nation states.  Enlightened 
states, he argued, had an obligation to uphold natural rights against less “civilized” 
powers.1   
 At the time of Jefferson’s presidency, from 1801-1809, he was not solely dealing 
with European powers.  The new American republic shared the continent with a 
multitude of Native American tribes whose interests were very different from Jefferson’s.  
The Native Americans constituted a challenge to Jefferson’s idealism.  They were, in his 
mindset, “uncivilized.”  They were not Christians, many did not derive their livelihood 
from agriculture, and some were nomadic.  This lifestyle, in Jefferson’s opinion, was not 
suitable for the modern world.  As Americans expanded west, the Indians had to live on 
smaller areas of land.  To facilitate this Jefferson attempted to “civilize” as many of the 
natives as he could and push the others west.  “Civilization” generally involved the 
conversion of Native Americans to an Anglo-American lifestyle.  This involved reliance 
on agriculture, a shift from communal to personal conceptions of property, and adoption 
                                                
1 Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (East Lansing: 
University of Michigan Press, 1963), 146. 
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of western gender roles, with men in the fields and women in the homes.  While doing 
this, he also had to maintain peaceful relations with the tribes to avoid war or worse, 
native alliances with European powers.  The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
Jefferson’s ideals about foreign relations as well as his diplomatic tactics applied to his 
relations with the Native Americans and were incorporated into his “civilizing” mission.    
This “civilizing” mission presents the greatest challenge to the comparison 
between Jefferson’s diplomacy and his Indian policy.  I argue that his attempt at 
“civilizing” the natives was not based on race, however, but on the supposed moral 
superiority of Anglo-Americans.  Jefferson believed that Indians were not fundamentally 
different.  He wrote, “We shall probably find that they are formed in mind as well as in 
body, on the same module with the ‘Homo sapiens Europaeus.’”2  Since this same moral 
superiority justified his diplomatic tactics with Europe, parallels can be drawn between 
them and the “civilizing” mission.   
This study will reexamine the relationship between the United States and 
neighboring Indian nations during the early years of American independence.  This will 
illustrate that, although these relations eventually became something very different from 
foreign diplomatic relations, they did not start out that way.  Differences that were 
present during Jefferson’s era were primarily due to imbalances of power and lack of 
unity and organization on the part of the Indians.  Jefferson made the same sort of 
coercive, unilateral demands with the Native Americans that he attempted when 
negotiation with European nations, but was far more successful with the natives who 
lacked the resources and unity to oppose him.  Political schisms within tribes made 
                                                
2 Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the 
American Indian (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).  20.   
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claims to the land ambiguous and Jefferson took advantage of this ambiguity by treating 
with the pro-“civilization” factions whenever he could.  The aim of American interaction 
with natives was to promote expansion to obtain land for republican farmers in the 
interest of ensuring natural rights in the same way that interaction with European powers 
was designed to secure these rights. 
 
Jeffersonian diplomacy has attracted the interest of many historians.  It had its 
roots in enlightenment ideals and was designed to promote America’s place in the 
international market.  It also took into account America’s position on the world stage, 
avoiding wars he could not win and promoting the notion that America was a bastion of 
liberty.  Historians tend to view Jefferson’s policies as a blend of idealism and realism.  
The idealism was the desire to secure liberty and other American values, while the 
realism was displayed through the avoidance of costly and unwinnable wars.  Historians 
have also written at length about Jefferson’s ideas and policies regarding American 
Indians.  These are usually presented as a conflict between “civilization” and the 
“savage.”  Jefferson attempted to incorporate Natives into white society as part of a 
‘philanthropic’ mission, while simultaneously manipulating them to get their land.  
Scholars approach the subjects of Jefferson’s diplomacy and his Indian policy as 
completely separate issues.  Works about Jeffersonian diplomacy make little or no 
mention of his dealings with the Indians, and those about Indians do not describe the 
relations in terms of foreign relations or diplomacy.  This is due to a combination of 
factors.  The sovereignty of native tribes during Jefferson’s time was ambiguous, and 
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since eventually all aspects of sovereignty were taken by later presidents, historians tend 
to accord natives at this time less sovereignty than was the case.   
 Gene Smith summarizes Jefferson’s diplomatic aims, writing, “Central to the 
Jeffersonian belief was that Americans had a natural right to fulfill their expansionist 
aims.”3  This is one of the essential themes historians write about in terms of Jefferson’s 
foreign policy.  He had a vision of an expansive republic of yeoman farmers and America 
required more land to bring this to fruition.  The landholdings of European powers in 
North America presented an obstacle to this.  According to Gene Smith, the way 
Jefferson went about dealing with these other nations exemplified his blend of realism 
and idealism.  Jefferson believed that control of the Mississippi River was essential to the 
survival of America.  He claimed that America had a natural right to the Mississippi 
because oceans and rivers were free to all of their inhabitants.  He also supported the idea 
of expansion by arguing that the availability of land to farmers was an essential part of 
the ‘pursuit of happiness.’ 
 Not only was Jefferson determined to expand America, he was determined to do 
so peacefully.  Gene Smith describes the goal of Jefferson’s expansion as “to conquer 
without war.” Smith cites Jefferson’s use of diplomacy to gain Louisiana without having 
to go to war as evidence for this claim.  Jefferson was willing to resort to extortion and 
threats of war but was reluctant to act on those threats due to the high price of war.  He 
threatened an alliance with Britain to intimidate the French, for example, but did so 
almost entirely as a diplomatic bluff.  Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson supported 
                                                
3 Gene A. Smith, “To Conquer Without War: The Philosophy of Jeffersonian 
Expansion in the Spanish Gulf Borderlands, 1800-1820,” Selected Papers: The 
Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850 23 (1994): 422.   
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this aspect of Jefferson’s diplomacy: “Negotiation was, indeed, Jefferson’s true policy: to 
conquer without war or, if this proved impossible, to conquer without a costly war.”4  The 
skillful avoidance of war contributed to the evaluation of Jeffersonian diplomacy as a 
blend of idealism and realism.  Realistically, wars were expensive and the United States 
was militarily weak, but threatening war based on principles of natural right gave 
Jefferson a moral high ground.  For example, he argued that French occupation of New 
Orleans would be crippling to America’s ability to navigate the Mississippi and thus to its 
economy in general.  He was therefore justified in doing whatever was necessary to 
preserve the natural right of America to participate freely in the international market.  
Similarly, Onuf and Sadosky emphasize the importance of free trade and neutrality in 
Jefferson’s diplomacy.  America’s place in the Atlantic market, they argue, was essential 
to its survival, and Jefferson attempted to promote this.  They describe the importance of 
“Jefferson’s free trade vision, and its corollary, the rights of neutral, noncombatant 
powers.”5  In dealing with European powers, it was most important to stay neutral and 
maintain trade.  
 In contrast, Jefferson’s policy towards relations with the Indians has been 
described as “Jeffersonian Philanthropy.”6  This consisted largely of what was considered 
a “civilizing” effort.  The advance of “civilization” in America in this view necessitated 
the recession of “savagery.”  The primary means of doing this was the destruction of 
                                                
4 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “Jefferson’s Risky Diplomacy of 
Watching and Waiting,” In Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, 
edited by Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 108.   
5 Peter S. Onuf and Leonard J. Sadosky, “Jefferson’s Blend of Realism and 
Idealism,” In Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, edited by 
Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 87.   
6 Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction.  
 6 
Native culture, and encouragement of Natives to adopt Anglo-American ways of life.  
Jeffersonian philanthropy encouraged Indians to adopt the idea of individually owned 
land that could be farmed for subsistence.  According to historians, the desire to enforce 
this idea coupled with American expansion led to aggressive land treaties in which tribes 
were induced to sell their collective land to the US government.   
 In these interactions, the Native Americans are often depicted more as victims 
than as active participants in diplomacy with the United States.  Historians argue that 
Jefferson and the government coerced and manipulated the Native Americans.  All of the 
power rested with the Anglo-Americans and none with the Natives.  This is probably why 
this relationship is not described in terms of foreign relations or diplomacy, even though 
official treaties and negotiations took place.  Works on Jefferson’s relations with Native 
Americans examine this relationship in light of events that happened long after.  Anthony 
Wallace describes the “coming doom of the red race” and refers to the “noble but 
doomed savages.”7  Although Wallace acknowledges negotiation for land cessions, trade 
and peace, he presents them in a primarily one-sided way.  Robert Miller describes 
American policy toward Native Americans the same way.  He writes, “‘law’ was used by 
Europeans, the American colonists, and the American state and federal governments to 
dominate Indian people and nations.”8  Historians view this interaction not as a conflict 
between two cultures or two nations but as a matter of oppressive domestic policy.   
                                                
7 Anthony F. C. Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First 
Americans (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), viii-ix. 
8 Robert J. Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas 
Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
2006), xviii.   
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 The historical analysis of Jefferson’s diplomacy tends to conclude that he sought 
expansion and promoted trade based on ideas from enlightenment philosophy as well as 
the realities of the world he lived in.  He promoted America’s interests and brought new 
lands under her control while avoiding war whenever possible.  Jefferson’s Indian policy 
is seen as a failed “civilizing” mission and a tragic destruction of the Native Americans.  
Scholars describe Jefferson’s government as dominating these people and stealing their 
land.  The historical works on these two aspects of Jefferson’s policy are written as two 
completely separate issues.  
 To date, the historiography demonstrates that Jefferson’s diplomacy and his 
Indian policies have been thoroughly researched, but little effort has been made to 
examine the extent to which the diplomatic ideals shaped the Indian policy.  This is 
evident because scholars writing on one subject do not mention the other, and the two 
ideas are approached using different methods and language.  It is the goal of this thesis to 
bridge the gap between the discussion of Jefferson’s Indian policy and his diplomacy in 
an attempt to further the discussion of both.  In addition to analyzing these two 
philosophies, two Native American tribes will be examined in depth: Cherokees and 
Creeks.  These tribes were selected because they were on the western frontier of the 
expanding American population and therefore central to Jefferson’s attempts at 
expansion. These tribes were also heavily influenced by interactions with European 
culture and were, for a time, held up as an example of the success of the “civilizing” 
mission.  Published government documents reveal Jefferson’s thoughts on these issues as 
well as instructions given to Indian agents and transcripts of some of the negotiations that 
took place between the agents and the tribes.  The extent to which the native leaders were 
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empowered and the instances when they refused to cede lands contribute to the 
discussion regarding tribal sovereignty and the diplomatic nature of the interaction.  The 
understanding of Indian relations in terms of diplomacy in addition to Jefferson’s 
“civilizing” mission helps to illustrate the distribution of power between natives and non-
natives in the early American Republic.  I argue that the Native Americans held a limited 
amount of power rather than just being passive victims of Jefferson’s policies.  
Jefferson’s diplomacy was justified by the supposition that America was a morally 
superior nation compared to any European power.  This rationalization extended to 
dealings with the Indians, which were justified by the same moral superiority. 
 9 
Jefferson’s Diplomacy: Idealistic Aims Through Practical Means 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s diplomacy was a very shrewd mixture of enlightened ideals 
and practical methods.  His end goal was always the preservation of American interests, 
which he articulated as “natural rights.”  In line with his enlightenment influences, he 
believed that the protection of his citizens’ private property was one of the primary 
functions of government.  In order to pursue these interests against stubborn and often 
more powerful European nations, Jefferson resorted to tactics that promoted his interests 
in the most practical ways.  He frequently made threats and demands, but knew when to 
keep pushing and when to step back.  He astutely kept America out of wars he knew it 
could not win, and used military force only when he knew he could do so effectively.  
This mix of enlightenment goals pursued via pragmatic strategy made Jefferson effective 
in his foreign policy.   
Thomas Jefferson’s idealism played a major part in his politics, and heavily 
influenced his diplomacy.  He operated according to a philosophical and moral code 
founded on the ideas of enlightenment philosophers like John Locke.  Jefferson’s 
devotion to protecting natural rights is one of the most obvious examples of this.  He tried 
to shape the government in such a way that it protected the natural rights of its citizens 
above all else.  In international affairs he did everything in his power to defend the 
natural rights of the nation, as an extension of those of the individuals.  Jefferson also 
developed very progressive ideas about where a government’s authority came from.  
These conclusions were then applied to his diplomatic thinking.   
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 Because Jefferson did not recognize a distinction between the relations of 
individuals and the relations of states, his ideas of individual rights factored into his 
diplomatic principles.  He argued that in diplomacy, the entire nation constituted a 
singular moral entity.  International affairs were not exempted from the system of 
morality that governed individual affairs.  He wrote, “I know but one code of morality for 
men, whether acting singly or collectively.”9  Based on this ideal, Jefferson wanted to 
create a new system of international order rooted in morality to replace the old system 
that simply pursued aristocratic self-interest by any means available.   
 The philosophy of natural rights articulated by Thomas Jefferson in the 
Declaration of Independence displays the essence of his thinking on the subject.  He 
wrote, “that all Men are created equal and independent; that from that equal creation they 
derive Rights inherent and inalienable; among which are the Preservation of Life, and 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”10  The protection of these rights, he argues, is the 
sole reason for government.  The only legitimate government is one that upholds man’s 
inherent rights.  Jefferson argued for the necessity of protecting civil liberties, writing, 
“God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time; the hand of force may destroy, 
but cannot disjoin them.”11  Many of these ideas regarding natural rights came from John 
Locke’s philosophy.  The only thing that Jefferson acknowledged to supersede these laws 
                                                
9 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, August 28, 1789, in Memoir, 
Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph (Boston: Gray and Bowen, 1830), http://www.gutenberg.org/files 
/16783/16783-h/16783-h.htm#link2H_4_0010.   
10 Thomas Jefferson, “Jefferson’s Original Draft of the Declaration of 
Independence,” Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/declara/ruffdrft.html. 
11 Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America 
(Williamsburg: Clementinarind, 1774), 23, http://www.loc.gov/rr/rarebook/guide/ 
ra008001.html.   
 11 
of nature was the right to resist self-destruction.  He argued a nation’s obligation to this 
code of morality was so binding that the only valid exception was when the performance 
of an obligation became impossible.12   
 An extension of these inherent rights was the right of revolution.  A government 
that does not uphold natural rights is not a valid government, and its people have the right 
to replace it.  In articulating this idea, Jefferson acknowledged that war was sometimes a 
necessary and valid means of securing ones rights.  The Declaration of Independence was 
written “with a clear understanding that the natural right to revolution is quite likely to 
involve war, or at least the credible threat of war.”13  The moral justification of war in 
defense of natural rights is something that Jefferson frequently used to his advantage in 
his diplomacy.   
Jefferson was also influenced by Locke in regards to ideas regarding the 
protection of private property.  This is essentially what “the pursuit of happiness” meant.  
In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke articulated the idea of property: “The labor 
of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say are properly his.  Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor 
with, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”14  
Jefferson’s devotion to the protection of the American farmer comes from this idea.  The 
act of tilling the soil transforms nature into property.  For this reason, Jefferson’s ideal 
                                                
12Adrienne Koch, The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1943), 145.   
13 John Zvesper, “Jefferson on Liberal Natural Rights” in Reason and 
Republicanism: Thomas Jefferson’s Legacy of Liberty, ed. Gary McDowell and Sharon 
Noble (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 21. 
14 John Locke, “Of Property,” in Two Treatises of Government, section 27, 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke2/locke2nd-a.html.   
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republic was made up primarily of small farmers, and government protected their right to 
their property and their livelihood in the soil.  Jefferson’s admiration of the farmers went 
so far as to describe them as “the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, 
and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most 
lasting bond.”15   
 This natural right of the farmer to take the land and make it his own is something 
that Jefferson extended into his international aims.  One of the reasons for pursuing 
expansionist aims was to make more room for the American yeomanry to pursue its own 
happiness.  Jefferson wrote of the American republic, “my hope of its duration is built 
much on the enlargement of the resources of life going hand in hand with the 
enlargement of territory, and the belief that men are disposed to live honestly, if the 
means of doing so are open to them.”16  The determination to expand continuously for the 
prosperity of the farmers necessitated further acquisition of land from America’s 
neighbors, namely European powers and Native American tribes.  Negotiating for this 
land would be an international issue, requiring the use of diplomacy.  This is one of the 
ways in which the pursuit of natural rights made its way into Jefferson’s ideas about the 
international relations of his day.   
 Another fundamental concept in Jefferson’s philosophy was that the authority of 
government comes from the people.  In the Declaration of Independence, he wrote, “To 
secure these ends, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
                                                
15 Jefferson to John Jay, Paris, August 23, 1785, in The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1905), 5:93. 
16 Jefferson to Monsieur Barre de Marbois, Monticello, June 14, 1817, in The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Association, 1905), 15:131. 
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from the consent of the governed.”17  This notion also comes from Locke’s idea that 
government comes either from force or from reason.  When there is conflict with no 
common judge, there can only be a state of war.  The purpose of society and of 
government is to avoid this state of war.18  So government must be based on reason rather 
than force, and the reason must come from the people.  In an enlightened society, this 
government by reason is a natural progression.  European monarchies relied on force and 
halted the development of the people, but according to Jefferson, “laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.  As that becomes more 
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and 
manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must 
advance also, and keep pace with the times.”19  The Republican form of government 
based on the will of the people would naturally advance as the people grew and changed 
because it allowed for development and the free expression of ideas.   
 The will of the nation is something that Jefferson gave deference to in his 
diplomatic philosophy.  In a letter to the minister to France during the French Revolution, 
he wrote, “We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government 
is founded, that every one may govern itself under whatever form it pleases, and change 
these forms at its own will, and that it may transact its business with foreign nations 
through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, convention, assembly, 
                                                
17 Jefferson, “Rough Draft of Declaration of Independence.”  
18 Locke, “Of The State of War,” in Two Treatises of Government, section 19-21, 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke2/locke2nd-a.html.   
19 Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, June 12, 1816, in The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1905), 15:41. 
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committee, President, or whatever else it may chuse.”20  This is an important principle 
when it comes to recognizing the authority of a government or government agent to make 
binding agreements internationally.  Since just government can only come from the will 
of the people, any agent that represents the will of the people has this authority.  This 
authority also comes with responsibility.  Jefferson further explained, “all acts done by 
those agents under the authority of the nation, are the acts of the nation.”21  This applied 
whether the agent was the king or an elected official.  An immoral act by a foreign 
government can be seen as an act of the foreign people as a whole because their 
government is their agent, as long as they have consented to that government.  
Furthermore, treaties made between two nations remain valid even if the government of 
one nation should change, because the treaties were made between the two nations, not 
between the two governments.   
 
 These ideals constituting the philosophical basis for Thomas Jefferson’s foreign 
policy and he always used them to explain the way he carried out his diplomacy in the 
real world.  He articulated his stance on important issues in a way that reflected principles 
of enlightenment and natural rights.  Throughout conflicts with foreign nations, Jefferson 
always claimed to be defending America’s natural rights, while also insisting that 
morality play a part in the diplomacy.  He made it clear, at least in words, he had every 
                                                
20 Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, Philadelphia, December 30, 1792, in 
Founders Online Archives, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0776.   
21 Thomas Jefferson, “Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson Defends the Treaty 
with France, 1793,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, vol. 1, ed. 
Dennis Merrill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 57. 
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desire to maintain friendly and peaceable relations between the United States and the rest 
of the world.   
Among the natural rights that Jefferson believed all nations had was the right to 
trade with foreign nations.  The contemporary international system ignored these rights, 
but Jefferson argued they existed whether they were acknowledged or not.  In describing 
the Louisiana territory’s essential role in American trade Jefferson wrote, “There is on the 
globe one single spot, the natural possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy.  
It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass 
to market.”22  If France were to set itself in New Orleans and cut off access for American 
goods to reach the market, it would be devastating to American commerce, and in 
Jefferson’s opinion, a violation of American natural rights. In October 1802, Spain 
suspended America’s right of deposit at New Orleans, proving that Jefferson’s fears 
regarding threats to American commerce were justified.  He believed the French to be 
responsible for this breach of American natural rights.  According to Paul Varg, at this 
point, Jefferson’s “attitude toward France changed from passive hostility to a belligerent 
demand for action.”23  This added aggression put more pressure on the French to sell 
New Orleans, and the threat of military action made France’s continued possession of 
New Orleans less certain.  That same year, when Robert Livingston, the American 
minister to France, was explaining his nation’s concerns to Joseph Bonaparte of France, 
he made his argument along those lines.  He reported to Jefferson, “I expressed to him the 
apprehensions of the jealousies that would naturally be excited from their vicinity, and 
                                                
22 Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, Washington, April 18, 1802, in The Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1905), 10:312. 
23 Paul Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, 153-4. 
 16 
the impossibility of preventing abuses in a military government established at so great a 
distance from home…that all we sought was security and not extension of territory.”24  
Jefferson strengthened his claims in international affairs through these appeals to natural 
rights and claiming that he only sought his nation’s security.   
 During the conflict with France over possession of Louisiana, Jefferson also gave 
validity to his moral stance by assuring the French that he had no desire but peaceful 
friendship between their two countries.  In his writings on the subject, Jefferson 
repeatedly appealed to the ideas of “mutual interest” and “friendship” between the two 
countries.  He argued that he was doing everything in his power to maintain these things 
but if France would not cooperate it would not be possible.  In one letter to Robert 
Livingston, Jefferson explained all of the possible negative repercussions that could 
ensue from the French maintaining possession of New Orleans, including losing 
American favor and probably New Orleans should war break out.  As an enlightened 
nation, America was morally obligated to attempt the use of reason before it used 
hostility.  By appealing to common interest and attempting to maintain good relations 
with France, a “natural friend,” Jefferson displayed his adamant desire for reason and 
morality to be the primary consideration in diplomatic affairs as they should be in all 
areas of enlightened, republican government.   
 
 Despite drawing on these high-minded ideals, Jefferson’s diplomacy also needed 
to produce results in the real world.  In practice, he had to take into account America’s 
limited resources and influence in the international community.  This realism was often 
                                                
24Robert Livingston to Thomas Jefferson, Paris, October 28, 1802, American 
State Papers, Foreign Relations vol 2, 525.   
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displayed through avoiding wars that Jefferson knew would be very costly and possibly 
unwinnable, particularly with powerful European nations.  He instead opted for the use of 
veiled threats, coercion and economic measures to deal with these issues.  When dealing 
with lesser threats, the Barbary pirates for example, Jefferson was more willing to use 
military force to support his ideals about natural rights.  The use of different tactics for 
different situations shows the extent to which Jefferson was aware of his nation’s position 
in the world and that, while he espoused ideas of enlightenment and morality, he was 
willing to use whatever means were available to him to achieve his desired ends.   
 When Spain ceded the Louisiana territory to France in December of 1802, 
Jefferson believed that this presented a threat to American commercial interests.  
Although Jefferson made arguments about natural rights and morality, the main reason 
for objection specifically to France holding Louisiana rather than Spain was that France 
was stronger and less likely to be induced to cede the territory.  Jefferson wrote, “Spain 
might have retained it quietly for years.  Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would 
induce her to increase our facilities there…Not so can it ever be in the hands of France.  
The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character…render it 
impossible that France and the U.S. can continue long friends when they meet in so 
irritable a position.”25  Although France maintained friendly relations with the U.S. and 
had not yet taken any action to indicate they might use Louisiana in a way hostile to U.S. 
interests, Jefferson realized that they would be harder to coerce into cession of the 
territory and therefore objected to the transfer.  
                                                
25 Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, Washington, April 18, 1802, in The Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1905), 10:312. 
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 Jefferson knew the advantage of negotiating with a nation when it was at its 
weakest and used this to his advantage.  He employed this tactic when negotiating with 
Spain over the boundaries of territory in Louisiana and the Floridas.  He wrote, “These 
claims will be a subject of negotiation with Spain, and if, as soon as she is at war, we 
push them strongly with one hand, holding out a price in the other, we shall certainly 
obtain the Floridas, and all in good time.”26  The desire to have the territory was based on 
its benefit to American commercial interests, but rather than make the argument of the 
natural right to trade, Jefferson was a proponent of waiting until Spain was weak and then 
exploiting that weakness.  He used the same tactic with France to obtain Louisiana.  
Knowing that a war between Britain and France was very likely in the near future, 
Jefferson exploited that situation as well.  He argued that French possession of New 
Orleans “seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive 
possession of the ocean.  From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet 
and nation.”27  An American alliance with Britain would have been very unfavorable to 
France in the event of war, especially for French possessions in North America.  If this 
were to happen, France would likely be unable to hold New Orleans.  In reality, Jefferson 
did not intend to pursue an alliance with Britain, but the threat took advantage of France’s 
weakness during a possible war.  This sort of “strategic feint” was characteristic of 
Jefferson’s diplomacy.28   
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 Another tactic that Jefferson was particularly fond of was making veiled threats 
implying that he might be willing to use military force.  He knew that a war with either 
France or Spain would be devastating to America because of its cost and the inevitable 
loss of commerce and lives.  Nevertheless, throughout his attempts to gain Louisiana and 
Florida, he always hinted at the possibility in order to give some weight to his arguments.  
The minister in France was instructed to impress upon the French that their possession of 
Louisiana “must have an instant and powerful effect in changing the relations between 
France and the United States…if a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi is to be 
added to other causes of discord, the worst events are to be apprehended.”29  This is 
clearly a threat, but by using vague terms, like “worst events,” it leaves things ambiguous 
and does not commit the U.S. to unfavorable military action.  Jefferson always presented 
threats of war as an inevitable consequence that he did not desire but would be forced 
into if he did not get what he wanted.  In February of 1803, as negotiations over 
Louisiana took place, the Senate provided some legitimacy to Jefferson’s threat of force 
by authorizing him to prepare 80,000 militiamen to use in protection of free navigation of 
the Mississippi.30  Throughout the negotiations, Jefferson pointed out that Louisiana 
would be in a vulnerable position militarily if France should find herself at war.  He then 
qualified his observations, “we do not bring them forward as a menace, but as 
consequences not controllable by us, but inevitable from the course of things…we 
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beseech a friend to look forward and to prevent them for our common interest.”31  This 
allowed him to maintain his image as a leader committed to the pursuit of peace and 
morality while still using the threat of war as a diplomatic tool.  
 Napoleon was swayed by the uncertainty of his hold on Louisiana, particularly 
during a war with Britain, but American threats may have also played a part.  When 
explaining his decision to sell Louisiana to the United States, he mentioned that the 
British had taken many territories from France, including their holdings in Canada, and 
he did not want them to also get Louisiana.  Referring directly to Jefferson’s arguments, 
Napoleon wrote, “They [America] only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but already I 
consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing 
power, it will be more useful to the policy and even the commerce of France, than if I 
should attempt to keep it.”32  In addition to his desire to keep New Orleans out of British 
hands, Napoleon believed Jefferson’s claims of desiring peace and friendship with 
France, so he ceded Louisiana to the United States on April 30, 1803.   
 
 Against weaker foreign powers, Jefferson displayed none of this same reluctance 
for war.  In 1801, early in his presidency he took up the issue of pirates along the Barbary 
Coast.  Ships from the Barbary Coast were capturing American merchant ships and 
interfering with American commerce in the region.  Jefferson’s initial response contained 
his typical assertion of good intentions and his desire for peace.  A letter to the Bey of 
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Tripoli said, “The assurances of friendship which our consul has given you, and of our 
sincere desire to cultivate peace and commerce with your subjects, are faithful 
expressions of our dispositions.”  In this case however, the use of military force was also 
presented as a legitimate threat.  Jefferson informed the Bey that, “We have found it 
expedient to detach a squadron of observation into the Mediterranean sea, to superintend 
the safety of our commerce there.”33  Jefferson still justified his actions with natural 
rights.  He mentions the safety of commerce, and in another letter he wrote, “the 
protection of our right to navigate the ocean freely has induced us to send a squadron into 
the Mediterranean sea.”34  Intent on protecting America’s interests, Jefferson was willing 
to do whatever was necessary.  In this case, more blatant aggression and a less formidable 
opponent allowed him to go to war in defense of America’s rights and national honor. 
 
Jefferson always directed his diplomacy toward the ends of protecting American 
interests.  He used idealism and belief in a moral law governing all areas of life, including 
the interactions between nations, to his advantage.  He articulated natural rights for states 
as an extension of the rights individuals were believed to have within enlightenment 
thinking.  Jefferson argued that every nation had a right to the sea and to commerce, and 
used these rights to justify his pursuit of these things for America in the international 
arena.  The tactics that he resorted to in each situation showed the extent to which he was 
a realist in his diplomacy.  He knew the strengths and weaknesses of each of his 
opponents.  He quickly used military force when he believed it was to his advantage, but 
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was very restrained when he saw that it would be destructive to his cause.  When pushing 
his concerns with foreign powers, he very astutely pointed out how it would be in their 
interests to do what he wanted.  He was also an opportunist who waited until an opponent 
was weakened, by being at war for example, and then took advantage of the situation.  
Thomas Jefferson claimed to be pursuing idealistic values while using pragmatic, 
opportunistic means to great success on the international level throughout his presidency.   
 Jefferson’s diplomacy was designed to protect American interests in the 
“civilized” world, in dealings with European nations for the most part.  The multitude of 
Native American nations sharing the continent with the United States occupied an 
ambiguous place within this diplomacy.  Jefferson and his contemporaries manipulated 
native forms of government, making authority indefinite and often allowing Americans to 
decide who they felt had the authority to make binding diplomatic contracts.  Jefferson’s 
conviction of the universality of natural rights did not extend into this arena.  He was 
unwilling to respect these rights when it came to dealing with his “savage” neighbors.  To 
reconcile these philosophical problems, Jefferson and likeminded individuals created a 
separate set of ideals governing their interaction with the Native Americans, centering on 
the idea of “civilizing” them as an act of philanthropy.  Despite this philosophical 
distinction between U.S.-international relations and U.S.-native relations, under 
Jefferson’s leadership both were carried out for the unilateral promotion of American 
interest, using the same tactics of flattery, threats, bribery and occasionally war.   
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Indians and the Republic: The Mutual Benefits of “Civilization” 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s views of Native Americans and their place in the changing 
landscape of his time were very complex and incorporated ambiguous and contradictory 
ideas.  He took a particular interest in the nature of the Indian, drawing on ideas of 
universal morality, civilization and, natural law.  While he generally concluded that 
Indians were not inherently inferior to Europeans, their place outside of “civilization” 
separated them from the ideal toward which he believed humanity was progressing.  This 
conclusion labeled the natives as “savage” and almost part of nature, but Jefferson and 
many of his contemporaries still harbored a sense of admiration for the Native Americans 
as a noble though simple people.  This analysis of the Native Americans opened the door 
to the possibility of their incorporation into the new American republic.  If they could be 
civilized and taught to rely on agriculture rather than hunting, they could be productive 
members of society, but equally important, they could subsist on smaller areas of land.  
This would open up more space for the expansion of white settlers who were constantly 
trying to push further west.  The “civilizing” mission was carried out in large part by 
religious groups hoping to convert the natives to Christianity, but the mission was as 
much about culture and way of life as it was about religion.  The government played a 
significant part in attempting to convert the native population into permanently settled 
farmers.  Jefferson posited that this conversion was the only way to ensure the survival of 
the native peoples.  They could either be incorporated into America and maybe 
eventually become citizens, or they would be continuously pushed west until there was 
nowhere left for them to go.  Thomas Jefferson explained his dealings with Native 
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Americans in terms of a moral philanthropy, but this philosophy served the same purpose 
as his rhetoric of natural rights and enlightenment in European diplomacy.  With the 
Indians, he used different arguments, but his overall tactics and goals were the same.   
 
 The nature of the Indians themselves was a topic of importance for Jefferson, 
because whether or not they were fully human in the same way that Europeans were 
would impact what should be done with them.  Jefferson himself was particularly 
interested in the origin of the Native Americans.  He studied their languages extensively 
to that end.  Noticing the amount of diversity present among their languages, he 
compared the natives to the “red men of Asia” writing, “a greater number of these radical 
changes of language having taken place among the red men of America, proves them of 
greater antiquity than those of Asia.”35  This line of argument was meant to give the 
Native American tribes a place within the accepted narrative of world history by showing 
that they had developed in the same way as other human societies, and demonstrate the 
capacity for further development into a civilized people.   
 Explaining away differences between Indians and whites was part of the larger 
Enlightenment movement to preserve an idea of a perfect natural order, according to 
Bernard Sheehan.  Thomas Jefferson accepted this and believed that nature was ordered 
and even “designed on a grand scale.”36  He had such faith in the natural order that he 
wrote, “such was the economy of nature, that no instance can be produced of her having 
permitted any one race of her animals to become extinct; of her having formed any link in 
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her great work so weak as to be broken.”37  The natives were part of this ordered chain of 
being, but they lived according to their circumstances, which separated them from the 
“civilized” culture of the white man.  Since this separation was circumstantial, Jefferson 
concluded “we shall probably find that they [Indians] are formed in mind as well as in 
body, on the same module with the ‘Homo sapiens Europaeus.”38 This same fundamental 
formation opened the door for the eventual incorporation of the Native Americans into 
white society.   
 Another argument that supported the potential for Indians to become civilized was 
their sense of morality.  Jefferson and many of his contemporaries believed in a universal 
morality.  The possession of morality by all human beings was yet another form of 
evidence for the ordered nature of the universe.  This morality was inherent in all human 
beings and could be strengthened through various means, but could not be learned.  
Indians possessed the same potential for morality as white men, in spite of their societal 
circumstances.39  In his observation of Indian society, Jefferson noticed, “their only 
controuls are their manners, and that moral sense of right and wrong, which, like the 
sense of tasting and feeling, in every man makes a part of his nature.”40  Jefferson 
believed there was an almost complete lack of government within native society, but they 
lived in an orderly way and crime was not common among them.  He noticed, “Every 
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man with them, is perfectly free to follow his own inclinations.”41  He admired the extent 
to which civil liberties were preserved within these societies.  He wrote, “I am convinced 
that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy an infinitely 
greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments.”42  In 
America however, the potential for civilized life in addition to freedom had been 
realized.43  Since the Native Americans hade the same potential for civilization as the 
white men, Jefferson believed it was possible and desirable to absorb them into the 
republic.   
 Despite this potential, it was evident to Jefferson that the natives needed help to 
convert to civilized modes of life.  For example, even though the Native Americans had 
lived on the continent for long enough to diversify and develop all of their different 
languages, they had not developed materially to the extent Europeans had.  Jefferson 
wrote very critically, “I know of no such thing as an Indian Monument; for I would not 
honor with that name arrow points, stone hatchets, stone pipes and half shapen images.”  
Despite this claim, he studied Indian burial mounds, admitting them to be the most 
respectable remains of Indian labor.  These mounds were still not, in Jefferson’s opinion, 
on the same scale as those of European civilization.  After studying and excavating the 
mounds, he concluded that the burials he encountered were in “utmost confusion,” and 
“give the idea of bones being emptied promiscuously from a bag or basket…without any 
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attention to their order.”44  The inability or unwillingness to build permanent structures to 
memorialize the dead, in Jefferson’s opinion, demonstrated a deficiency in Native 
American development.  America was seen as a vast untouched natural resource that 
could be transformed into something useful given the right circumstances.  The Native 
Americans were part of this natural landscape and Jefferson believed that they too could 
be “developed.”  This would be part of the ideal development of mankind as a whole, 
“this march of civilization advancing from the seacoast, passing over us like a cloud of 
light, increasing our knowledge and improving our condition…and where this progress 
will stop no one can say.”45  According to this reasoning, it was a moral imperative to 
civilize the Indians, not only for their sake, but to contribute to the overall progress of 
humanity.   
 
 The means to bring about this transformation of the natives were a “civilizing” 
mission and the subtle use of coercive force to manipulate them into adopting a different 
lifestyle.  The “civilizing” mission was the publically acknowledged effort to “save” the 
Indians from their own ignorance.  It was seen as a moral duty and carried out by those 
who considered themselves philanthropists.  Manipulation was the Jefferson 
administration’s more secretive attempt to simultaneously divest the Indians of their 
lands and induce them into a static farming lifestyle.  This involved taking advantage of 
the reliance many tribes had developed on American goods in order to create debt, which 
could only be relieved through the cession of tribal lands.  Jefferson conveniently 
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combined philanthropy and hunger for land into policies governing intercourse with the 
Native Americans.   
 The philanthropic push to save the Indians was partly motivated by the notion of 
the “vanishing Indian.”  Many, including Jefferson, believed that the Indians were on 
their way toward extinction and that “the ultimate point of rest and happiness for them is 
to let our settlements and theirs meet and blend together, to intermix, and become one 
people.”46  The only hope for the survival of the Indians, he believed, was as part of the 
American republic.  The progress of civilization would not allow for their mode of living 
much longer.  Jefferson argued, “I consider the business of hunting as already becoming 
insufficient to furnish clothing and subsistence to the Indians.  The promotion of 
agriculture, therefore, and household manufacture, are essential in their preservation, and 
I am encouraged to aid and encourage it liberally.”47   
 The incorporation of religion into this mission was a controversial element.  Many 
of those attempting to bring civilization to the Indians were missionaries doing so 
primarily through religious conversion.  Jefferson and other Enlightenment thinkers 
argued that the Indians should be brought to civilization gradually.  They believed that 
there was a universal progression of humanity that began with keeping domestic animals, 
then farming, property, the use of money, then literacy, and only after that would 
religious sentiment develop.48  This conversion should begin with simple skills and only 
introduce Christianity once the Indians were civilized enough to understand and accept it.  
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This ambivalence regarding religion likely reflects Jefferson’s own interpretation of 
Christianity.  In his own religious life, he focused on the morality taught by Christ rather 
than the religious dogma of the church.49  When it came to the Indians, he thought it 
would be far more useful to reinforce natural morals than to import a completely alien 
ideology to them.  Jefferson wrote, “the missionary of supernatural religion appeals to the 
testimony of men he never knew, and of whom the infidel he labors to convert never 
heard…But the missionary of natural religion can appeal at all times and everywhere, to 
present and immediate evidence, to the testimony of sense and intellect.”50  Because of 
these convictions, official government civilization efforts during Jefferson’s presidency 
emphasized adoption of American culture rather than religion.   
Along with this conversion, land would inevitably be ceded to advancing white 
settlers as Indians became farmers and no longer needed as much land.  This was almost 
entirely to the benefit of the United States, but Jefferson presented it to the Indians as an 
act of benevolence.  He wrote to a Miami chief, Little Turtle, “I have…always believed it 
an act of friendship to our red brethren whenever they wished to sell a portion of their 
lands, to be ready to buy whether we wanted them or not, because the price enables them 
to improve the lands they retain, and…support them more plentifully.”51  On the surface, 
this program with the Indians was shown as an effort to incorporate the Indians into white 
civilization, for the mutual benefit of improving their mode of living and freeing their 
lands for use by American settlers.   
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 In reality, the wellbeing of the Native Americans was not the highest priority for 
Jefferson.  In a letter to Andrew Jackson in 1803, Jefferson admitted, “In keeping agents 
among the Indians, two objects are principally in view: 1. The preservation of peace; 2. 
The obtaining of lands.”52  Interaction with the Native Americans was meant to acquire 
their lands for use by white settlers as cheaply and peacefully as possible.  And while he 
claimed to be “alive to the obtaining lands from the Indians by all honest and peaceable 
means,”53 his commitment to “honest means” did not prevent the economic manipulation 
of the Indians.  In 1803, he instructed William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana 
territory at the time, “we shall push our trading uses, and be glad to see the good and 
influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts 
get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a 
cession of lands.”54 Jefferson justified this kind of manipulation by his belief that the 
conversion of Indians into farmers was the only way to ensure their continued existence.   
 Jefferson’s willingness to allow Native Americans into U.S. society along with 
his fascination of their society, evident by his extensive studies, leave little doubt that he 
genuinely wanted to promote their wellbeing.  His official policies and the way in which 
they were carried out also make it evident that Native American interests were never his 
top priority.  Above all, Jeffersonian philanthropy was designed to acquire land for the 
United States.  Reginald Horsman argues Jefferson wanted the Indians to benefit from 
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“civilization,” but if they did not accept this offer, “they would be swept aside.”55  In any 
instance when Jefferson was forced to choose between pursuing American interests and 
preserving Native American interests, he chose the former.   
 
 Native American resistance to his policies often challenged Jefferson’s 
determination to keep his methods peaceful.  Many Native Americans were not willing to 
give up their way of life to adopt Western culture, which they deemed inferior.  White 
society was plagued with problems and even many whites who lived with the Indians 
adopted the native lifestyle rather than return to the European one.  Another complication 
was the involvement of European nations in Native American affairs.  Jefferson and his 
contemporaries believed the Indians were inherently more corruptible due to their 
uncivilized state.  This meant that despite the separation between the Native Americans 
and the United States, the government had to prevent Europeans from taking advantage 
of this corruptibility to the detriment of American interests.  Tribes that would not adopt 
“civilized” modes of living could not simply be ignored or compelled through military 
force, because they might then turn elsewhere for aid, making the fight more costly.   
Interaction with whites brought a significant decline in native populations to the 
point where some tribes were extinct or in danger of becoming extinct.  The white men 
had also brought liquor to the Indians, which had a terrible effect.  The sale of alcohol 
quickly became a contentious issue between natives and the government.  Tribal leaders 
asked for legislation preventing the sale of alcohol in their territory. In 1802, Congress 
passed an act prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians.  The determination of liquor 
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traders to make money from the Native Americans rendered the good intentions of the act 
ineffectual.  The act was only enforceable to a limited extent and white frontiersmen 
largely disregarded it.  Jefferson wanted to use the act to build a better relationship 
between the two societies but the almost ungovernable interaction between whites and 
Indians on the frontier hindered this step in the civilizing mission and gave Native 
Americans yet another reason to be skeptical of government efforts to help them. 
The uncivilized nature of the Native Americans made them easily corruptible in 
Thomas Jefferson’s opinion.  This brought about a fear that one of America’s potential 
enemies, France, Spain or England, could use hostile tribes against the US in the event of 
war.  To combat this, Jefferson argued, “The principles on which our conduct towards the 
Indians should be founded are justice and fear.”56  When the peaceful negotiations and 
attempts at cultivating friendship failed, something else was needed to keep the Indians 
from becoming a threat.  The superior technology and comparative immensity of the 
American military filled that role.   
Leading up to the War of 1812, the United States and Britain were each doing 
their best to win over the support of powerful tribes.  The Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa 
and his brother Tecumseh led a pan-Indian movement and had the support of the British.  
Few tribes ended up allying with the United States, mainly only pro-civilization factions 
in the Creek and Cherokee tribes.  Americans were indignant at British influence over 
Indian tribes, because they did not hesitate to use them against whites.  During the 
American Revolution for example, British commander Henry Hamilton used a force 
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composed of Cherokees, Chickasaws, Shawnees, and Delewares to attack Virginians.57  
Jefferson argued that Indians should not be encouraged to attack civilized people writing, 
“we wish not to expose them [the British] to the inhumanities of a savage enemy…we 
would not have our national character tarnished with such a practice.”58  Despite this 
noble sentiment, Jefferson was aware of the potential military use of tribes, and 
especially the confederacy of tribes forming around Tecumseh during the later years of 
his presidency.  Engaging in the same kind of manipulation that he detested in the British, 
Jefferson wrote to his Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn, “could not [William Henry] 
Harrison gain over the prophet, who no doubt is a scoundrel and only needs his price?”59  
These attempts were unsuccessful though and the prophet and his brother Tecumseh 
ended up fighting against the United States during the War of 1812.  Jefferson later told 
John Adams that he had left the prophet alone “till the English thought him worth 
corruption, and found him corruptible.”60  Clearly the corruptibility of the Indians was a 
convenient diplomatic tool.  Tribes that accepted American influence, like “progressive” 
elements of the Creek and Cherokee tribes, were becoming civilized and should be 
respected as noble peoples.  The tribes that fought against America, the nativist factions 
of the Creek and Cherokee as well as the Shawnee and the rest of the tribes in 
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Tecumseh’s movement, were only displaying their “savage nature.”  In many southern 
tribes, the Cherokee for example, use of “civilized” agricultural and domestic practices 
was common.  These tribes were also the most friendly to American interests and 
Jefferson used them as proof of the merit of cultural conversion.61   
This also removed any blame from Jefferson or his government regarding hostile 
tribes and created fear that could be used to justify action against them.  Jefferson’s 
willingness to use deadly force against Indians was made clear in a letter to William 
Henry Harrison.  Jefferson wrote, “Should any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the 
hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across 
the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a 
furtherance of our final consolidation.”62 
 
Jefferson’s ideas about the racial equality of Native Americans were well ahead of 
his time.  He was able to articulate them convincingly using arguments that incorporated 
enlightenment ideas about the order of nature and the inherent morality of man.  This 
humanity only meant that the Native Americans had the potential to become equals of 
Europeans though.  Their “uncivilized” ways, resulting from their circumstances in the 
untouched American wilderness, set them apart from the march of human advancement.  
In order to save them from extinction and to improve the republic at the same time, 
Jefferson attempted to convert them to farmers.  They could then sell their extra lands for 
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the expanding nation.  These goals were pursued with shrewd practical means in much 
the same way that Jefferson’s diplomacy was.  Obtaining lands, particularly near rivers 
and important trade routes was his top priority in both cases, as it was necessary to ensure 
the survival of the United States.  Also, the idea that the plans he was proposing were of 
mutual benefit to both parties, which was ever present in his foreign relations, was the 
basis for his arguments for Indians to part with their lands.  In the end, just like in 
diplomatic negotiations, when his efforts were persistently opposed, Jefferson threatened 
war by referring to it as an inevitable consequence of resistance.   
The philanthropic claim of Jefferson’s Indian policy is certainly questionable.  
The basis of the idea was that the Native Americans would be improved if they could be 
made more like whites.  This comes from an unwillingness to challenge the idea that 
“civilization” was progressing and that the Europeans were at the forefront of that 
advance.  Despite Jefferson’s claims regarding the equality of man, he subscribed to an 
elaborate philosophical system that designated the natives as inferior to their white 
neighbors.  Taking land from the Indian tribes was articulated as an incentive to get them 
to farm so that they could survive in the changing world.  This was merely a justification 
for land grabs, which were always beneficial to whites while the payments given to the 
tribes in return were only occasionally advantageous.  Also, the reason that hunting had 
to be replaced with agriculture as a means of supporting the tribe was that white settlers 
had taken the hunting grounds, sometimes with treaties and sometimes without.  The 
“civilizing” program was designed to allow Native American tribes to live on less land.  
This was almost entirely to the benefit of whites that wanted the land.  It is possible that 
Jefferson genuinely believed that there was an inevitable march of “civilization” and that 
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if the Native Americans were not induced to become part of it, they would become 
extinct.  An examination of Jefferson’s dealings with the Cherokee and Creek tribes, 
however, will demonstrate that these land cessions were part of Jefferson’s larger plan for 
America and were motivated by a variety of factors that were not “philanthropic” for the 
Indians.  Moral rhetoric was a convenient tool to justify his actions, but Jefferson dealt 
with the Native American tribes with the same adamant self-interest that was evident in 
all areas of his diplomacy.   
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Disputed Land Cessions from the “Civilized” Cherokee 
 
The Cherokee were one of the larger, more important tribes with whom Jefferson 
negotiated in his attempts to expand the United States and “civilize” the natives.  They 
constitute an interesting example because of the extent to which many among them had 
already adopted western modes of living.  Another reason for their relevance is that the 
U.S. sought the land they occupied because it stood between American settlements.  After 
the Louisiana Purchase, Cherokee territory was also an obstacle to expansion to the 
Mississippi.  Jefferson’s diplomacy, as well as his Indian philosophy, shaped the way he 
interacted with the Cherokee and instructed his agents to treat with their chiefs.  He 
assured the Cherokees that the goals he had in mind were for their own good as well as 
America’s, he used veiled threats, and he argued that he had a right to secure American 
commercial and agricultural needs.  Jefferson used this pragmatic style of diplomacy, 
constructed to fit the specific circumstances that he encountered with the Cherokees, to 
obtain land from the tribe.   
Jefferson’s philanthropy seemed to be a success among the Cherokee given the 
advancement of “civilization” among them and their rapidly shrinking land claims.  As 
the tribe’s resources dwindled, the government continued to push for more cessions due 
to the insatiable hunger of white settlers for land.  The end goals of the “philanthropists” 
were not the same as those of the expansionists.  Jefferson’s philanthropy justified taking 
land only by arguing that it was the best way to preserve the Indians, but the destructive 
nature of deals made by American agents showed that the government had little regard 
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for the Cherokee’s wellbeing, and that the needs of the American nation took precedence 
to those of the tribe. 
 
The history of the Cherokee tribe influenced the way they responded to American 
attempts to obtain land in Jefferson’s day.  Historical traditions and a culture that traced 
its roots back to long before European arrival still shaped important parts of the Cherokee 
worldview.  Anglo-Americans’ ignorance of these traditions, or feigned ignorance, 
complicated diplomatic relations with the tribe.  The pattern of interaction that had 
developed between Cherokees and whites since Europeans had arrived in the New World 
also influenced interaction.  This gave the Americans a precedent for justifying violence 
and putting pressure on the tribe to cede lands.  It made the Cherokees suspicious of 
treaties and American promises.   
 The origins of the Cherokee tribe are uncertain because there are many competing 
theories.  One creation story that was popular among the Cherokee suggests that they 
were created in the traditional homeland of the tribe, in what became the southeastern 
United States.  Other stories claimed that the Cherokee migrated from great distances, 
possibly from Asia or South America and then fought long wars to claim the land they 
later occupied. Either way, the Cherokees came to inhabit a vast area of land.  The earliest 
known information stated that the Cherokee lived in modern North and South Carolina, 
Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee. 63  Whatever the 
origin of the tribe, this area had been their home as long as anyone could remember, and 
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was a principal part of the Cherokee identity.  Whether they were created there or had 
conquered the land, it belonged to them collectively, as Cherokee.   
 By the time Jefferson entered into negotiations with the tribe, there was a 
semblance of centralized government.  Influential chiefs claimed to speak for the tribe as 
did a National Council.  This centralization was relatively new, however, and developed 
mainly as a tool for dealing with European nations.  At the time of European arrival, at 
least 80 autonomous towns composed the Cherokee “nation,” each with between 200 and 
250 inhabitants on average.  Every town had its own peace chief who dealt with domestic 
and ceremonial life, as well as a war chief who handled negotiation with outsiders, trade, 
and war. The tribe was divided into seven clans, each constantly battling the others and 
fighting for political power.  They carried out responsibilities that were later left to a 
centralized government.  When the tribe later negotiated with the United States, Indian 
agents chose small groups of chiefs whom they assumed to be representative of the entire 
tribe.  Because of the decentralized nature of the tribal leadership, left over from the 
earlier, traditional system, the Cherokee people often contested the notion that a few 
chiefs represented the entire Cherokee tribe, which complicated negotiations. 64   
Belonging within the clans was matrilineal, as were many things in Cherokee 
society.  In their traditional towns, before European influence, women had their own 
councils and wielded political power along with the men.65  Women were also providers, 
since agriculture was strictly a female occupation, except for certain male captives who 
were ritually adopted to replace dead women. This matriarchal society was very shocking 
to Europeans and was one of things that they attempted to change when they later 
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“civilized” the Indians.  The established gender roles within the tribe persisted throughout 
early contact, however, as they were the “most profound social distinction” among the 
Cherokees. 66     
According to the Cherokee worldview, maintaining balance and order was very 
important.  Every being had a proper place within the order of the universe.  This 
reinforced things like tribal leadership, clan belonging and gender roles.  Religious ritual 
was an essential part of preserving balance.  Cherokees believed that a number of 
ceremonies performed throughout the year brought spiritual favor to the tribe.  As 
Americans later tried to “civilize” and Christianize the Cherokees, they viewed these 
rituals as an obstacle to the progress they hoped to make.  The centrality of these rituals 
to maintaining balance, and therefore to Cherokee identity, drove a wedge between the 
two societies.  One of the most important ceremonies was the Green Corn Ceremony.  
Cherokee believed a plentiful harvest was the gift of the Corn Woman, the spiritual 
mother of the Cherokee.  The Green Corn Ceremony thanked her for this harvest.  
According to tradition, the Corn Woman told the Cherokee, “If you forget to think of 
me,…but make use of me without remembering my words, I will fling among you The 
Desolator!”67  One of the American agents to the Cherokee, Return J. Meigs, noticed, to 
his disappointment, that this ceremony was still religiously observed during a visit to the 
Cherokees in 1801.  He wrote, “In dancing their motions are slow, decent, graceful, & 
regular…hardly a smile to be seen on their faces.  The appearance suggests the Idea of a 
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religious dance.”68  This and many other aspects of traditional Cherokee culture survived 
contact with Europeans and Americans and even attempts at “civilizing” the tribe.   
 Agriculture, which Jefferson believed inextricably connected to “civilization,” 
was part of Cherokee society long before his civilizing mission.  The tribe principally 
supported itself through farming and hunting.  The men hunted and the women grew 
corn, squash, pumpkins, beans and harvested wild berries, nuts, and mushrooms.69  Their 
interest in farming made the Cherokees open to improved techniques and farming 
equipment introduced to them by the Americans.  By the mid-18th century, the Cherokee 
had adopted many aspects of European life.  Commercial hunting with guns had replaced 
subsistence hunting with traditional weapons; Cherokee abandoned traditional crafting 
methods for new technological ones and kept domestic farm animals.  Their economy 
depended on trade with the Europeans as hunters began to focus on pelts rather than food.  
Elites even held slaves and experimented with the plantation system.70  Meigs noticed 
that slaveholders among the Cherokee were “in favor of improvements and have very 
much thrown off the savage manners and habits of their ancestors.”71  Americans 
encouraged these practices, believing they would lead to civilization. 
Ironically, the Cherokee religious tradition, which the agents tried to suppress, 
was one of the things that made even the conservative members of the tribe open to 
improvement of the agricultural system.  Ceremonies like the Green Corn Ceremony 
were given to the tribe as gifts by outside forces to help with farming.  New technology 
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brought by Europeans could be viewed in a similar light, as gifts given to help the 
Cherokee people.72  In a subtle act of manipulation, Americans were even able to shift 
some of the agricultural duties onto the men of the tribes.  They accomplished this 
through the introduction of household arts to Cherokee women.  Women adopted 
spinning, and weaving so agriculture was therefore increasingly left to the braves.73   
 Jefferson and his contemporaries believed that the Cherokee had made great 
strides toward civilization, and that this was the result of their philanthropic efforts.  
While many eastern Native American tribes farmed, the Cherokee were very receptive to 
American technological advancements and in some cases changed their society to 
incorporate those advancements.  One example was the successful transference of 
agriculture to the men in society through the introduction of spinning and weaving among 
the women.  The provisions of treaties for land cessions provided some of the most 
compelling evidence of the “progress” of the tribe.  In one treaty, signed in 1791, the 
Cherokee secured the promise of farming implements from the U.S. in addition to money 
in exchange for land.  The fact the Indians themselves actively sought the agricultural 
advancement that the “philanthropists” wanted to provide encouraged them of the 
possibility of success.  The Cherokee even reminded government officials on a visit to 
Philadelphia shortly after the signing of the treaty, “the treaty mentions ploughs, hoes, 
cattle, and other things for a farm, this is what we want, game is going fast away among 
us.”74  Also, when passing through the Cherokee territory in 1796, Benjamin Hawkins 
                                                
72 Gregory Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 9.   
73 Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, 166. 
74 Bloody Fellow to Secretary of War, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, vol. 
1, 205.   
 43 
noticed the Indians raised and sold cattle to whites, planted cotton and even fenced some 
of their fields, orchards and livestock.75 
This early acceptance of European technology and practices, relative to other 
tribes, made the Cherokee one of the more receptive tribes to Thomas Jefferson’s 
“civilization” program.  It also made him optimistic about the potential success of this 
mission.  An examination of the pressure put on the tribe to obtain land demonstrates the 
hollowness of Jefferson’s claim that American demands for land cessions aimed at 
encouraging Cherokee adoption of agricultural practices.  The Cherokee were already 
adept at farming.  But they were not exempt from the philanthropic loss of lands and, in 
fact, may have experienced greater pressure to cede lands than less “civilized” tribes.  
Jefferson’s belief that eventually the tribe would be absorbed into American society may 
also have been a factor in pursuing Cherokee land, but this was not a conclusion that the 
Cherokee accepted.  Even the accommodationists among the Cherokee simply wanted 
assistance with the economic development of the tribe.  According to Meigs, in 1805, it 
was still a widespread belief among the Cherokee that Indians were not created in the 
same way or by the same Great Spirit as the whites.  He wrote that they believed, “they 
are not derived from the same stock as the whites, that they are favorites of the Great 
Spirit, & that he never intended this people to live the laborious lives of the whites.”76  
These views undermined Jefferson’s agenda and presented an ideological obstacle to any 
attempts at “civilization” that sought to promote change on a fundamental societal level.   
                                                
75 Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians, 287. 
76 Meigs to Hawkins, Southwest Point, February 13, 1805, quoted in Dowd, A 
Spirited Resistance, 175. 
 44 
 In 1800, just before the start of Thomas Jefferson’s first term as president, only 
43,000 square miles remained of the Cherokee tribe’s territory, a miniscule fraction of the 
lands occupied before European arrival.  Chiefs whose leadership was no longer 
recognized bore responsibility for the cession of many of these lands.  The remaining 
lands were located in what are today northern Georgia, Alabama and eastern Tennessee.  
As the U.S. expanded westward and acquired the Louisiana territory, the Cherokee had 
white settlers on both their eastern and western borders and faced pressure for roads 
connecting the two through Tennessee.  By this time, in addition to traditional 
agriculture, the Cherokees had started growing peaches and potatoes and keeping bees.  
The lowland towns in the South were the most “civilized,” with a large number of 
influential whites and Cherokees with mixed blood living in them.  The upper towns in 
the north maintained a more conservative way of life.77  This schism between north and 
south provided a convenient opening for land hungry Americans to exploit in their 
diplomatic dealings with the Cherokees.  
 
 The actual negotiations and treaties that occurred between the United States and 
the Cherokee tribes were fairly straightforward.  The United States sought lands for 
settlers, roads connecting towns for trade and communication, and the use of rivers for 
commercial purposes.  In principle, these were the same goals that drove Jefferson’s 
diplomacy.  Also like his diplomacy, Jefferson intended for these negotiations to secure 
American interests without costly wars and articulated his arguments in his idealistic, 
moral rhetoric, in order to preserve the reputation of the United States.  Notions of 
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“civilization” did complicate this process, however, and make it unique.  The ambiguity 
of tribal authority gave Indian agents the opportunity to find the chiefs most receptive to 
their aims and then act as if those chiefs represented the tribe.  The limited resources of 
the Cherokee, economically as well as militarily, also allowed Jefferson to treat with 
them with less fear of a military backlash than a powerful nation like Britain.   
 Indian agents were responsible for carrying out the actual interactions with the 
Indians.  Under Jefferson’s administration, these agents answered to Henry Dearborn, the 
secretary of war.  Jefferson described Dearborn as a man “whose qualification and 
standing have possessed [him] of the public confidence, and whose wisdom may ensure 
our fellow-citizens the advantages they sanguinely expect.”78  He believed that Dearborn 
was a man who would do what was in the best interest of the republic.  Dearborn 
instructed the agents on behalf of the president and sometimes amended instructions in 
response to requests from Jefferson himself.  The secretary of war carried out Jefferson’s 
wishes in Indian policy. 
 The instructions Henry Dearborn gave to commissioners appointed to treat with 
the Cherokees in 1801 display the clear-cut, practical aims of the administration.  
Dearborn laid out a list of objectives including obtaining lands in Northern Tennessee 
and securing permission to build a road across Cherokee territory.  In these instructions, 
Dearborn wrote, “It is of importance that the Indian nations generally within the United 
States should be convinced of the certainty in which they may, at all times, rely on the 
friendship of the United States, and that the president will never abandon them… while 
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their conduct shall be peaceable, honest, and fair.”79  This rhetoric of peaceful intentions 
and desire for friendship is the same that appeared repeatedly in Jefferson’s diplomatic 
dealings with European nations.  He presented the same qualification as well.  The United 
States would be friendly with the Cherokee as long as they remained “peaceful, honest, 
and fair.”  This implied that if Jefferson were to pursue military action against the tribe, 
he could appear to be doing so reluctantly, and only because the Indians had forced his 
hand.  This was exactly the same tactic he used when negotiating for New Orleans in the 
following years.   
 An amendment to Dearborn’s instructions sent a few days later showed the 
subtlety and timing with which Jefferson pursued land cessions from the Cherokee.  
Dearborn explained that since there was a misunderstanding about the boundary between 
the Cherokees and the whites, “it is evident that the Cherokee have testified much 
dissatisfaction on hearing that the government were about to request them to cede more 
land.”  Because of this, the president had instructed that the commissioners only negotiate 
for the road that was to go through Cherokee lands.80  In only pursuing this objective, 
Jefferson was prioritizing the military and economic benefit of the road above the 
marginal advantage of gaining more land for settlers.  This also exemplifies the prudent 
application of pressure on a diplomatic opponent, which Jefferson was very skilled at.  
He knew when to adamantly push his interests with unilateral demands and when to hold 
off and peacefully negotiate for smaller objectives.  Dearborn thus instructed the 
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commissioners to, “State none of [the desires of the government] in the tone of demands, 
but, in the first instance, merely mention them as propositions…their assent to which the 
Government would consider as new testimonials of their friendship.”81  Jefferson 
presented this to Congress as evidence that he respected the rights of the Cherokee.   
 The commission sent to the Cherokees delivered a speech explaining the 
president’s desires to the chiefs of the Cherokees on September 4, 1801.  The 
commissioners presented the need for the road using ideas similar to the assertion of 
“natural rights,” but without using those words.  They explained that current roads were, 
“narrow and obstructed by fallen timber, with rivers and creeks, which prevent them from 
pursuing their lawful business.”  This could be seen as protecting the American right to 
commerce and to freely trade between the distant settlements.  They did not use the term 
“natural rights” because of the assumed lack of civilization of the Cherokee.  Instead, the 
“father,” the president, was trying to accommodate the needs of both his red children and 
his white children.  The commissioners explained that this road would be of mutual 
benefit to the Cherokee.  The request “is intended not to extinguish your rights, but to 
give value to your land, and make it immediately productive to you.”82   
 After hearing these arguments from the Agents, Doublehead responded on behalf 
of the Cherokees.  He began by saying, “it seems…that means have been provided, to 
take care of the red people; and the present President, it seems, cherishes the same good 
wish towards us…we hope his good disposition towards us will continue, that our 
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children will live in peace.”83  He accepted Jefferson’s claim that he desired peace and 
wellbeing for the Cherokee, and used the same diplomatic tactic in return, claiming that 
the Cherokee also only wanted peace.  He established his authority to treat with the 
United States, claiming, “in behalf of my nation, I am authorized to speak with you.”  By 
acknowledging that his authority came from his tribe, he assumed the same role as any 
European diplomat addressing the United States, and claimed the ability to make binding 
agreements for his people.  He rejected the request to make roads, arguing that it would 
encourage more white settlers and would bring extra traffic through Cherokee territory.  
He then used Jefferson’s own tactic and once again assured the commissioners of his 
nation’s friendly intentions, “We mean to hold fast the peace which is subsisting between 
you and us; to preserve this, we hope you will not make roads through our country.”  In 
an act of pragmatism similar to Jefferson’s customary veiled threats, Doublehead made it 
clear that the United States would be breaking its own agreement by building these roads 
and that he would remain peaceful and give them no pretext to use force to do so.  In his 
speech, Doublehead also used paternal rhetoric, referring to Jefferson as the father and to 
his tribe as the children, showing the effectiveness of this tactic.  In this case, as with 
most diplomatic situations with European nations, the argument that America needed to 
do something to preserve its economic interests and natural right was not enough to 
convince the Indians to yield something of value.  That these arguments were used and 
that the Cherokee were able to refuse the proposition shows the extent to which this was 
in fact a diplomatic interaction despite the hegemonic American ideas of “civilization” 
and the paternal rhetoric.   
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 With the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1803, Thomas Jefferson set his 
sights on the Mississippi.  His determination to hasten the nation’s westward advance 
resulted in increased pressure on the Cherokees to cede lands.  In early 1803, Dearborn 
once more attempted to gain Cherokee permission for a road through their territory, and 
faced defeat once again.84  Dearborn then instructed his agent, Return J. Meigs, to win 
over some of the influential chiefs by bribery.85  After this, interactions between the 
Cherokee and the U.S. government went more smoothly, and the tribe agreed to the road 
later that year.   
In 1805, Meigs returned to the Cherokee with the mission of acquiring the land 
north of the Tennessee River, which would allow the unification of eastern and middle 
Tennessee. The diplomatic parties signed two treaties in Tellico on the 25th and 27th of 
October, 1805.  The treaties ceded more land to the United States and allowed for the 
building of several roads through Cherokee land.86  These two cessions combined with 
another in the previous year ceded 8,000 square miles of Cherokee territory.  Increased 
pressure to obtain these lands led to a change in tactics of negotiation.  This time Meigs 
threatened to withhold annuities to the tribe unless they agreed to the cession.87  He 
continued to use the rhetoric of maintaining peace and helping neighbors.  The treaty 
itself claimed, “the Cherokees, being possessed of a spirit of conciliation, and seeing that 
this tract is designed for public purposes…cede to the United States said section of 
                                                
84 Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 125.   
85 Dearborn to Meigs, May 30, 1803, Washington, quoted in Horsman, Expansion 
and American Indian Policy, 125.   
86 Articles of a Treaty between the United States of America and the undersigned 
chiefs and headmen of the Cherokee nation, October 25, 1805, American State Papers, 
Indian Affairs, vol. 1, 697-8.   
87 Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 161. 
 50 
land.”88  Doublehead explained the need to agree to the treaty to the other chiefs, saying, 
“we think that…we shall agree to the request of our Father, at least in part…the Agent 
had informed us that he could not be Justified in continuing the presents of wheels, cards, 
and implements of husbandry…as he had done before.”89  Doublehead was convinced 
that the sale of the land was necessary because of these threats and informed Meigs of 
this.  Meigs then wrote to another commissioner, “They appear convinced that it will not 
do to put off the business.  They are assured from every quarter that the white people are 
irritated at their refusal to comply.”  In this case the strong-arm tactics worked in forcing 
easily influenced chiefs like Doublehead to agree to the treaty.  In return for this cession, 
the United States gave the tribe additional annuities and reserved some lands for the 
private use of Doublehead and Toluntuskee, two of the chiefs who signed the treaty.   
Doublehead emerged as the leader of a faction of Cherokees friendly to the 
United States, and ceded lands on behalf of the tribe.  During this time, the Indian agents 
continued using the same kinds of arguments justifying the necessity of the land cessions, 
namely that they mutually benefitted the United States and the Cherokees, and that they 
proved the good faith and peaceful intentions of the natives.  After another cession of 
land in January 1806, Jefferson awarded Doublehead one thousand dollars, “in 
consideration of his active influence in forwarding the views of Government, in the arts 
of civilization among the Cherokee Nation.”90  Even when it came to bribery, Jefferson 
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continued to argue that he was helping the Cherokee people.  He articulated 
Doublehead’s actions as those of an enlightened individual acting for the benefit of his 
less civilized brethren.  Now that the United States had the opportunity to expand to the 
Mississippi, Jefferson had more incentive to push the Cherokee off of their land and 
remove them as an obstacle to the march of civilization.  This added motivation led 
Jefferson to use more aggressive tactics with the tribe.   
Doublehead was recognized as a legitimate leader of the Cherokee tribe earlier in 
his life.  During the Revolutionary War, he was among the leaders of the Chickamauga 
faction of the Cherokees, aiding the British and resisting American influence.91  He fell 
out of favor because of his willingness to give in to American demands during the later 
portion of Jefferson’s presidency.  It may be that he began to agree with Jefferson’s 
argument that the “civilization” and incorporation of native society by the United States 
was inevitable.  Also, with the mounting government pressure for Indian removal, and 
threats of annuities being withheld, he had little choice.  It is also important to note the 
increasing factionalism within the Cherokee tribe at the time.  What to do about land 
cessions and “civilization” was a highly contentious issue on which the tribe was deeply 
divided.    
 In 1806, a Cherokee embassy to Washington learned of the “gifts” that the 
government had given Doublehead.  The more conservative upper towns immediately 
declared that land grants made by Doublehead were invalid because he did not have the 
authority to make them, or to accept the gifts.92  The councils of the upper towns 
informed Jefferson that Doublehead and his party did not have their support.  James Vann 
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was an influential chief in the upper towns and emerged as one of the leaders of the new 
faction.  Vann declared that future cessions would only be valid if they were done under 
the authority of the National Council.93  This new faction led by Vann had the support of 
much of the upper towns, but they by no means had the entire tribe behind them.  
Doublehead, Toluntuskee, Black Fox and other chiefs still led the opposing faction and 
had support from their respective towns.   
An internal conflict within the Cherokee tribe ensued.  The U.S. government was 
certainly aware that Doublehead did not speak for the entire tribe, and had heard James 
Vann’s arguments against accepting future cessions from Doublehead.  The issue at stake 
here was the authority of an individual to make binding contracts on behalf of the nation.  
Jefferson’s based his rationale in holding the entire Cherokee tribe accountable for the 
deals of Doublehead on his idea that agreements made between leaders represented 
contracts not only between the leaders themselves but also between their respective 
nations.  This was the same argument he used to hold the French Republic to treaties that 
Louis XVI signed with the United States.94  The problem was that with the Cherokee, no 
chief could speak for the entire nation at this time.  The authority was decentralized 
because of the large number of chiefs left over from earlier structure of the tribal 
government, and even within the centralized council, there was no consensus.   
Jefferson took advantage of this decentralization by selecting the most favorable 
faction and treating with it.  It was apparent that neither Doublehead nor Vann had the 
unanimous support of the tribe.  Jefferson did as he always did in diplomacy and acted in 
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the way that he expected to produce the best practical results.  After Doublehead was 
assassinated, Jefferson could not continue to deal with his faction.  Doublehead’s 
opponents went to Washington, declared that they had deposed Black Fox and 
Toluntuskee and all of Doublehead’s other supporters.  They claimed the support of all of 
the Cherokee towns and used “philanthropy” to support their argument.  They said, 
“Father those men that wants to move…throw away the plow and pick up the gun and 
also throw away the wimmin Spinning wheles.”95  Jefferson had secured many of the 
lands that he wanted, and these chiefs had the support of much of the nation.  They also 
promised to allow continuance of the “civilizing” mission, so he acknowledged their 
leadership.   
 
 Many among the Cherokee nation eagerly adopted aspects of American culture, 
particularly technological innovations.  Jefferson and his administration viewed these 
things favorably and believed that the Cherokee were progressing towards “civilization.”  
Their optimism in these efforts was not entirely justified, as many fought to preserve the 
old way of life and even among the most progressive Cherokees, few desired total 
assimilation into white society.  Jefferson ignored these complications and used the tribe 
as an example of the potential success of the “civilizing” mission.  If the motivation for 
Jefferson trying to take their land truly was the “philanthropic” service of “civilizing” the 
tribe, then one might expect less pressure on the already fairly “civilized” Cherokees than 
the more savage tribes.  If Jefferson meant to force savages to turn to farming by taking 
land, it was unnecessary to do so with a tribe that had already adopted modern agriculture 
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to the extent that the Cherokee had.  The reality was the opposite, almost immediately 
after each treaty ceding land, agents went to negotiate for more.96  Jefferson was 
unrelenting in his efforts.  Dearborn justified the intense pressure on the Cherokees 
explaining that as the U.S. took more land, the Cherokee “will be enabled to make still 
greater progress in the useful arts and will more and more rely on Agriculture and 
domestic manufactories for their support and of course become a happier people.”97  In 
this case it is clear that Jefferson’s priority was obtaining land for the benefit of the 
United States.  There was no reason to apply intense pressure with such urgency if 
“civilization” of the Indians was the principal goal.   
 The rhetoric of philanthropy was a useful tool in negotiating with the Cherokee 
because it reassured them that the government was looking out for their interests too.  
Jefferson warned the Cherokee in the same manner that he warned European nations.  He 
claimed that he desired peace above all but if his people’s rights could only be protected 
with force then he would use force.  He used whatever moral, idealistic argument suited 
his needs.  In the case of the Cherokee this was mainly the idea of philanthropy, but in the 
end, his goal had little to do with the Cherokee at all.  He simply wanted to gain land and 
protect American commercial and military interests, and philanthropy was a convenient 
excuse.   
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The Temporary Success of “Civilizing” the Creeks 
 
 Just to the South of the Cherokee’s territory was another powerful Indian nation: 
the Creeks.  The Creeks were a diverse people made up of a variety of tribes that joined 
together over time and developed a shared cultural identity.  Like the Cherokees, the 
Creeks were pressured for and agreed to several land cessions under Jefferson’s direction.  
The Creek’s territory bordered American settlements on the east, and after the Louisiana 
Purchase, on the west as well.  This made the land increasingly valuable for American 
expansion.  Much of the Creek land was within the borders of Georgia, and pressure from 
the state led Jefferson to pursue these cessions more adamantly than he otherwise may 
have.  “Civilization” of the tribe was wrapped up in the cessions, with farming 
implements and education being offered as part of the payment for cessions but it was 
mostly used as a convenient tool to take advantage of the tribe.  The agent for the tribe 
created a central tribal government to help the Creeks be more like a “modern” nation.  
This government facilitated land cessions because many of the chiefs were proponents of 
the “civilization” program.  With this tribe, Jefferson operated with the same motives and 
using the same tactics as he did in other areas of diplomacy.  He sought expansion and 
the protection of American economic interests.  In order to obtain these things, he treated 
with the Creeks to gain lands both for use by white settlers and for the natural resources 
on the land.  In negotiations, he emphasized the idea that the United States was morally 
justified in seeking these lands because they were helping to “civilize” their inhabitants.  
He also continued to make the argument that he only wanted peace between the nations 
and what he was doing was for the good of them both.   
 56 
 
When the Europeans arrived in the new world, the Creeks inhabited modern 
Alabama and Georgia.  Their territory bordered the Cherokee lands in the North, the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws in the West, and later the English colonies on the East and the 
Spanish in the South.  At this time the confederacy was made up of fifty to eighty towns 
with a total population estimated between eleven and twenty-four thousand.98  Creek 
territory was divided into two separate regions, the upper towns along the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa rivers and the lower towns along the Flint and Chattahoochee.  The 
confederacy was made up of various tribes that were initially only loosely associated but 
in times of crisis or war, they came together.  The confederate nature of the Creeks led to 
a unique experience when dealing with the early European colonization.  Creeks often 
annexed tribes they conquered in war, but after European contact they began also to 
absorb refugees from white settlers, like the Natchez tribe, which was almost wiped out 
in fighting with the French.  The Euchee people in the Tennessee River Valley joined the 
confederacy after being crowded out of their homeland by the English.  Small groups of 
refugees, many of them Shawnee, came to settle in Creek lands as well.99  This gave the 
tribe an especially diverse makeup and also meant that they had a wealth of firsthand 
experience of the destructive possibility inherent in European colonization.   
 Agriculture was an important part of Creek life, even before the Europeans, just 
as it was with the Cherokee.  Each family had a small garden in front of their home where 
they grew corn, beans and tobacco, but there was also a large field for each town where 
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the people farmed together.  The people of each town all contributed and worked together 
to plant on this field and later to harvest the crops.  This was central to the communal 
identity of the Creek Indians and helped form a spirit of unity in each town.  When the 
crops were harvested, each family had its own storehouse, but there was also a public 
storehouse that kept food for public needs.  In this way, the land itself was one of the 
things holding the Creeks together.  Hunting also contributed to town identity, since each 
town had its own hunting areas, which other towns were not allowed to use.  Hunting was 
also part of the communal identity of the Creeks because it was done in groups and often 
took place before a community celebration or feast.100   
 The Creek confederacy had a centralized government similar to that which was 
later adopted by the Cherokee.  Creek towns were either white towns or red towns, and 
matters of importance to the whole tribe were decided at councils in the leading white or 
red towns.  White towns were used for internal affairs, making peace, and adopting new 
tribes into the confederacy.  Red towns held councils declaring war, conducting foreign 
relations and diplomacy, and planning military action.  It was rare that all of the towns 
were represented at these councils, but towns that were not included often provided input 
via messengers.  The influence of each chief depended on the prestige of his town, and 
sometimes chiefs of important towns were allowed to speak for their entire region.  
Decisions were made by the most important chiefs, but the opinions of all of the chiefs 
and of the Creek people in general were taken into account.101  The structure of this early 
form of government was conducive to diplomacy with Europeans and later America 
because there was a precedent for one chief or a small group of chiefs to make decisions 
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for the nation.  This also shows that the desires of the tribe as a whole were important in 
making decisions, but ultimately the chiefs on the council spoke for the tribe.   
 In Creek society, the opinion of the majority was generally respected, but force 
was not used to compel dissenting towns to comply with decisions, so town councils 
were more of a forum for debate than anything else.102  In cases of intense disagreement 
between factions, they did not confront each other openly at councils.  During a conflict, 
one side would simply not come to the council.  This tradition continued even after the 
advent of the National Council when, during the time Hawkins pressured the council for 
land cessions, those opposing the sales refused to attend.103   
 Ritual ceremonies were a major part of what it meant to be Creek.  Other tribes 
that the Creeks absorbed adopted the Creek ceremonies in one form or another.  Just like 
the Cherokee, the most important Creek celebration was for the corn harvest, and it was 
called the “busk.”  A Creek described this ceremony to Benjamin Hawkins around 1790, 
saying, “It is our opinion that the origin of the Boosketau [busk] and our physics proceeds 
from the goodness of [the Master of Breath]; that he communicated them in old times to 
the red people, and impressed it on them to follow and adhere to them, and they would be 
of service to them.”104  During the observance, the inhabitants of the town danced 
together to display their shared experience and their relationship to nature.  The ceremony 
also marked the Creek new year when crimes were forgiven, marriages and divorces 
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addressed and other business taken care of.  This ceremony showed the importance of 
agriculture to Creek communal identity, as well as their deep, religious connection with 
the land.105  It also showed that the mythological origins of things like the corn ceremony 
were instances of the tribe being helped by some powerful outside force and may have 
made some more open to the innovations brought by the Europeans.  The busk was of 
such importance to the Creeks that even in times of war, as when they were aiding the 
British during the American Revolution, the Creeks put aside all other business and 
attended the ceremony.106   
 The Creeks had extensive relations with Europeans once they established a 
foothold in the south, something that shaped how they would go on to interact with the 
United States.  The central location of the Creeks between the different colonizers gave 
them the opportunity to trade with whomever they wanted, but also meant that they 
experienced pressure for their lands on all sides. The Creeks interacted with the Spanish 
in Florida both diplomatically and through trade from the time they founded Pensacola in 
1698.  When the French settled in modern Alabama in 1702, the Creeks allowed them to 
establish a fort in Creek country, and both peoples agreed upon rules governing trade and 
other interactions.  The English, settled in Charleston in 1670, were the main influence on 
the tribe.  This was in part an economic decision by the Creeks, since the English paid 
more for Creek goods and charged less for European goods than their competitors.  When 
English traders first arrived among the Creeks, they provided them with guns to use 
against enemy tribes that had already acquired them.  The English also brought new and 
intriguing goods to the Indians, like bells and brightly colored cloths, which they had 
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never seen before.  The Spanish by comparison were not focused on trade and had few 
guns they were willing to part with.107  The Creeks and English mutually benefitted from 
this relationship.  The Spanish tried to prevent the English from trading with the Creeks, 
but the Creeks hid English traders from Spanish soldiers and continued to trade.108   
French, Spanish and English visitors to Creek country were all accorded the same 
courtesies, the Creeks remained more or less neutral with them all, but the English were 
most willing to adopt the Creek custom of gift giving and participating in formal Creek 
town meetings.109  In this way, an early partnership developed between the Creeks and 
English traders.   
 The changing landscape of the American continent through the 18th century 
affected the relationship of the Creeks and the Europeans.  After 1763, following the 
French and Indian war, the English were the strongest remaining power in the region.  
They dominated commerce and left the Creeks with little alternative to trading with them 
almost exclusively.  The tribe actively participated in the American Revolution on the 
side of the British.  They raided American settlements and attacked along the frontiers.110  
After the war, feelings of hostility remained between the newly formed United States and 
the Creeks, who had not been considered in peace negotiations.  Georgians attempted to 
use a Creek chief who had been friendly to their cause during the war to cede lands on 
behalf of the tribe in 1783.  A council of Creeks denounced the cession, but when it was 
                                                
107 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade 
with Anglo-America, 1685-1815, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 28.   
108 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 29. 
109 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 30-31. 
110 Debo, The Road to Disappearance, 37-8.   
 61 
made anyway, they burned down the renegade chief’s house and destroyed his cattle.111  
The infuriated chiefs even went so far as to seek the assistance of the Spanish, signing a 
treaty that placed the tribe under Spanish protection in 1784.112  Jefferson and many other 
Euro-Americans treating with the Native Americans later used the same tactic that 
Georgia had used, with other tribes, finding sympathetic chiefs to cede land on behalf of 
the tribe, but in this instance, the Creeks did not tolerate it.  In addition to allying with the 
Spanish, Alexander McGillivray, a half-white, western educated chief, convinced Spain 
to allow the tribe to also trade with the British.  He argued that, “the formidable Indian 
Confederacy of the late war against the Americans must always be a great check on the 
States in preventing their ambitious designs of possessing themselves of all the Western 
Countrys.”113  This displays the diplomatic proficiency of tribal leaders in gaining 
European support against a common threat.  Eventually a group of Creek chiefs came to 
an understanding with the United States and signed a treaty in New York in 1790, which 
ceded some of the land in question but also provided for an annuity for the Creeks and 
aided in “civilization.”  Shortly afterwards, some of the tribe denounced this treaty, and 
loyalty split within the tribe between chiefs loyal to the United States and those who still 
opposed it.114  The Creeks lost the aid of their English allies after Jay’s Treaty in 1794, 
and they lost their Spanish friends after the Treaty of San Lorenzo the following year.  
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With these treaties, the U.S. gained the lands surrounding the Creek confederacy and 
American influence quickly replaced the vacuum left by the Spanish and English.115   
 
The emphasis on “civilization” as an essential part of interaction between 
Americans and Creeks illustrates Jefferson’s tendency to defend his diplomacy with 
moral arguments.  He used his concept of philanthropy to justify attempted acculturation 
of this tribe.  When Jefferson, and Dearborn and others praised the progress of 
“civilization” among the tribe, they were essentially making the argument that whatever 
they were doing was justified, because they were saving the Creeks from their eventual 
destruction.  This was a different moral argument than Jefferson used to justify his 
conduct when negotiating with a nation like France, for example, but the presence of an 
underlying philosophical basis for his diplomacy shows continuity between dealing with 
the Creeks and with other nations.   
The main agents of “civilization” to the Creeks prior to Jefferson’s program were 
the English traders who lived among them.  These traders integrated themselves into 
Creek and often took Creek wives.  The traders benefited immensely from this interaction 
and quickly became wealthy.  On the eve of Jefferson’s presidency, traders among the 
Creeks had dozens of cattle, horses, and slaves and grew cotton in plantation systems.  
Elite Creeks emulated this lifestyle, keeping slaves of their own and experimenting with 
the plantation lifestyle.116  These “elites” tended to be the mixed-blood Creeks and many 
of them were so “progressive” that they could barely be distinguished from white settlers 
living on the fringes of Creek territory.  They abandoned the matrilineal household for 
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the western “nuclear” family, took European sounding names, and undermined 
communal land ownership by claiming the best lands for themselves.117  The presence of 
traders also changed the leadership of the tribe following the American Revolution.  
Many important leaders were killed during the conflict and the men who rose to take their 
places were half-Creek sons of white traders.  These individuals were suited to deal with 
the increasingly important interactions with Anglo-Americans because they had grown up 
in Creek society but often had more European educations.  They were literate, spoke 
English, and whites were more willing to treat with them.118   
 As the American agent to the Creeks, Benjamin Hawkins led the first federally 
supported mission to “civilize” the confederacy.  Hawkins was a devoted Indian agent 
who did his best to help the Creeks while also carrying out his orders to support pro-U.S. 
factions and promote land cessions.  He was criticized by land hungry southerners for not 
gaining land quickly enough.  They accused him of undue sympathies for the natives, but 
he always had Thomas Jefferson’s support.  Henry Dearborn was pleased and optimistic 
about Hawkins’s progress in civilizing the Creeks.  He said, “The progress made in the 
introduction of the arts of civilization among the Creeks must be highly pleasing to every 
benevolent mind, and in my mind…may ultimately destroy all distinctions between what 
are called Savages and civilized people.”119  Just like the Cherokees, the Creeks were one 
of the tribes that were held up as and example of the success of philanthropy and 
“civilization” by their proponents.   
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 Hawkins advocated for the Creeks to abandon hunting, fence their fields, and 
acquire the skills for domestic industry.  Domestic industry provided an opening for 
change since this would involve introducing new pursuits specifically for native women.  
Hawkins found women willing to adopt western household pursuits, like spinning and 
weaving, and used them to subtly undermine Creek society.120  The value of these new 
activities was immediately evident as clothing produced this way was much easier and 
more plentiful than skins obtained by hunting.  Hawkins described male feelings on this 
matter, writing, “The chiefs, who were apprehensive at first, that if their women could 
clothe and feed themselves by their own exertions, they would become independent of 
the degraded state of connexion between them, have had proofs that the link is more firm 
in proportion, as the women are more useful, and occupied in domestic concerns.”121  
Since women were the traditional keepers of the family garden plots and played an active 
part in the communal farming, these new duties left an increasing share of the agriculture 
to the men of the tribe.  Through this transition, the Creeks realized that these new 
activities were less labor intensive and more stable than their previous reliance on 
hunting, especially with the shrinking hunting grounds resulting from land cessions.   
Hawkins also encouraged this shift by introducing sheep and plows to Creek 
society.122  The effort to promote keeping livestock was very successful and Hawkins 
believed it was “more relished by the Creeks than any part of the plan devised for their 
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civilization.  They are now eagerly acquiring cattle, by every means in their power.”123  
Along with livestock, the Creeks also began fencing their fields.  Between 1798 and 
1802, 400 Creek settlements were fenced.  Property was not traditionally considered to be 
of much importance, but under Hawkins’ encouragement, this was one of the 
fundamental ways that Creek society began to change.  Another indication of the 
increasing emphasis on property by some Creeks was inheritance.  Before the late 18th 
century, a dead Creek’s possessions were buried with him, but it became increasingly 
common for his sons to keep them and even to fight over them.124  The method of 
Hawkins’ “civilization” was similar to that of the English traders who came before him.  
He operated a slave-run farm where he taught Creek women to spin, weave and keep 
house.125  In this way, he encouraged the Indians to follow his example without having to 
force anything upon them.  Because Hawkins shared Jefferson’s ambivalence regarding 
organized religion, Christian missionary work-and therefore formal education-was not 
part of this “civilization” effort among the Creeks.   
 In addition to this philanthropic effort, Hawkins also encouraged the formation of 
a centralized, western-style government for the Creeks.  He put an end to the peace and 
war towns and placed most of the power under a central body.126  He sought to create a 
Creek government with distinct legislative, executive and administrative branches that 
would be strong enough to unite the various political factions within the confederacy as 
well as to combat regional differences.  He planned a central body called the “National 
Council,” which would meet yearly in the same place, a town on the Tallapoosa River.  
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At the Council, one individual from the Upper towns and one from the Lower towns were 
elected to be Speaker of the Nation.  These were the men that the Americans treated with, 
but their authority was not absolute and, in theory, they could be thrown out of this 
position if their actions did not reflect public opinion.127  This council could be used as a 
forum for Indian-white relations, and the decisions would be put in writing and regarded 
as the “will of the nation.”128  From the philanthropist’s mindset, this form of government 
helped the Creeks by providing organization to their political system and adding a forum 
for debate about the future of the nation.  But the concept was not entirely new and 
previous Creek councils had also provided structure and allowed debate.  The National 
Council was different because of its regularity and incorporation of the whole Creek 
nation.129   
 In order for this council to be effective in making binding treaties with the U.S., it 
needed to be able to enforce its decisions.  Traditionally Creek councils did not have this 
ability, but this was something Hawkins sought to change.  He appointed a warrior for 
each town to enforce laws by punishing thieves and making sure other warriors did not 
attack whites.  He advocated violent, public punishment for those who violated the law.  
In one instance, a group of Creeks accused of interfering with an American land survey 
were brutally beaten to death by a group of warriors, on Hawkins’ orders.  But even after 
this new “police” system, law enforcement remained rare and opposition to decisions of 
the National Council was common.130   
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This new National Council was really for the benefit of the Indian agents.  
Hawkins informed Dearborn’s predecessor, James McHenry, “An establishment of this 
sort appears to me indispensable to enable the nation to fulfill its engagements with 
us.”131  The interactions between the Cherokees and the U.S. government show the 
difficulty of making treaties with a decentralized people and expecting all of the members 
of the tribe to adhere to the treaties.  If Hawkins’s plan worked, the decisions of this body 
would be respected by the Creek nation because this council was their official 
representation.  This council also gave agents a convenient place to introduce their pro-
civilization ideas.  Benjamin Hawkins also wrote, “I doubt not, in a few years, it will be a 
useful instrument to approximate them to a more civilized state, and give the United 
States a more commanding influence over them.”132  Hawkins met with some success 
until 1805 when followers of the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa and his brother 
Tecumseh spread anti-white sentiment through the Creek confederacy and the tribe’s 
loyalty began to split between chiefs who supported “civilization” and those who 
opposed it.  Ironically when Tecumseh visited the Creeks and shared his plan for an 
Indian confederacy, it was at the National Council.133   
 
 Treaties negotiated between the United States and the Creek tribe were done 
through this National Council that Hawkins created.  The first major treaty negotiated by 
the Council was the Treaty of Fort Wilkinson, which was signed June 16, 1802.  Earlier 
that year, Georgia ceded some of its western lands to the federal government with the 
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understanding that those lands would be cleared of their Indian inhabitants as soon as 
possible.134  Despite the overarching claims of Jefferson that Indian lands were cleared 
for philanthropy, in this case, by far the strongest force in favor of the cessions was the 
pressure by Georgia and white settlers who wanted the lands.  Because of this pressure 
for the lands, agents carried out these negotiations with more urgency and aggression 
than might have been necessary simply for the sake of “civilization.”  Benjamin 
Hawkins, Andrew Pickens and James Wilkinson were sent to treat for this particular 
cession.  James Wilkinson began the negotiations by attempting to intimidate the Creek 
leaders.  He listed murders and other offenses that neighboring whites alleged the Creeks 
had committed.  He told them that they needed to cede the land because soon there would 
be no game left for them to hunt, but their compliance would ensure their nation’s 
survival by turning solely to the plow.  Wilkinson wrote that he intended to “excite a 
strong sense of humiliation and dependence” with his demands.135  This tactic makes 
sense considering the extent to which the Creeks had become dependent on the United 
States at this point.  In addition, Jefferson’s plan to encourage influential Indians to 
acquire debt added to the already sizable debt that the Creeks had built up through 
decades of trading with Americans and Europeans at a deficit.136  When the chiefs agreed 
to the treaty, it involved the forgiveness of a debt of over ten thousand dollars to the 
American factory.137  The incorporation of “civilization” into these negotiations and 
exploiting the Creek economic dependence shows how Jefferson always tried to show a 
diplomatic opponent that what he wanted was in their mutual interest.  In this case, the 
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Americans would get the land they wanted and the Creeks could prove themselves good 
neighbors, relieve their debts and continue their progress toward “civilization.”   
 The Creeks were not entirely submissive in these negotiations.  They pointed out 
the white encroachment on their lands, which violated their previous agreements with the 
United States.  One of the Creek chiefs, Hopoi Micco complained to the agents, “We find 
that houses are built on our lands, and fields are cleared and cultivated; we shall wait a 
reasonable time, to give an opportunity to the officers of Government, whose business it 
is to attend to such things, to move these people off...if they do not move off, we shall 
consider these things as our property.”138  In response, the United States agreed to build 
military forts between white settlements and Indian lands.  The Creeks then ceded one 
tract on the Altamaha River and part of another on the Oconee.  In return they received an 
annuity, a yearly salary for the leading chiefs in the National Council and ten thousand 
dollars worth of goods.139  Many of these goods were for farming and other “civilized” 
pursuits, which allowed agents to make the argument that the cessions had been 
philanthropic.  Wilkinson and Hawkins reported to Henry Dearborn that, “A solid 
foundation has been laid for a salutary reform in the habits and manners of this people; 
and we have no doubt that…the great work of their civilization may be accomplished.”140  
The young warriors, who did not reap the benefits of “civilization,” objected to the treaty, 
and the inhabitants of the lands to be ceded boycotted it.  More brazen Creeks even 
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threatened to kill the representatives in the Council.  None of this made any difference as 
the Council agreed to the deal and ignored the opposition.141   
The purchase of the Louisiana territory from the French changed American 
relations with the Creeks just as it did with the Cherokee.  This change led Jefferson to be 
more forceful with the Cherokees, but many of the Creek leaders supported the United 
States and trusted Hawkins, so their situation did not require the same escalation in the 
urgency of land cessions.  In 1804, Jefferson wanted permission for roads across Creek 
land and the rest of the land tract on the Oconee River, which was withheld in the 1802 
treaty.  He instructed Hawkins to meet with the Creek council to treat for these things. 
Whites were settling in the newly purchased lands west and south of Creek country and 
needed a way across.142  Hawkins met with the chiefs and explained the necessity of 
ceding the lands.  Hopoi Micco agreed with Hawkins that the sale was necessary for the 
survival of his people.  Hawkins recorded, “He [Hopoi Micco] understood well what was 
said to them in the name of the President…and was very desirous of doing what might be 
agreeable to him; but his nation were yet in the dark, and foolish; and that, of all things, 
this of land selling was the most disagreeable to an Indian.”143  Hawkins continued to 
negotiate with the other chiefs who did not share Micco’s views.  They were mainly 
concerned with the value of the land and making sure that they were compensated fairly, 
and that the compensation was distributed to the whole tribe.  At the conclusion of the 
negotiations, the Creeks gave Hawkins what he wanted and he agreed to pay in stock 
amounting to more than what he had been instructed to offer.  He defended this, writing, 
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“I have done the best I could in this transaction, and I believe a delay to another year 
would not have benefitted us, and it would have greatly inconvenienced the views of 
Georgia, who have an undoubted right to these lands, whenever they can be obtained at a 
reasonable price, and the one given, in my opinion, is far from being unreasonable.”144  In 
this instance, the Creeks used Georgia’s pressure to obtain the land quickly to their 
advantage.  They knew the value of their land and used that knowledge to their advantage 
diplomatically.  Jefferson’s general policy was to press and threaten force when he 
believed it would work, but hold back in other cases.  In this case it was most important 
to obtain these lands for Georgia peacefully.  If the cession was disputed, the Creeks 
might start making raids in the territory and then Jefferson would have to intervene 
further, costing more money and resources, and delaying expansion.  This also gave 
credence to his claim that these cessions were supposed to benefit the Creeks as well as 
the Americans.  Since the Creeks were rewarded for the cession with the ability to 
continue the progress of modernization, it was ultimately for the good of the tribe as well.   
The treaty was not ratified by the senate because of the amount of money promised to the 
Creeks.  The next year Hawkins led six Creek chiefs to Washington where they signed a 
treaty with Henry Dearborn on November 14, 1805.   
Before signing, they debated the value of the land with Jefferson.  The 
“civilization” of the Creeks backfired in this instance as they explained to Jefferson the 
abundant resources on the land and the potential for sawmills and timber.  The price they 
asked for was about ten cents per acre and at the time the United States paid an average 
of two cents per acre of Indian land.  The chiefs knew that this was still less than the land 
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was worth, and when the treaty was signed, the price amounted to over nine cents per 
acre, to be paid over eighteen years.145  Hawkins’ having offering more than he was 
authorized to was one reason he was accused of being overly sympathetic to the Creeks, 
but really simply shows that both he and the Creeks were aware of the real value of the 
land.  He described the cession to Dearborn as “unquestionably the best land in this 
country.”146 
 In this treaty the signing chiefs served their own interests while ignoring the good 
of the tribe.  The National Council told them not to agree to the establishment of a road 
through Creek territory but they did anyway.  Two of the signers, Alexander Cornels and 
William McIntosh had plans to profit from ferries and inns that would be needed along 
the road.  In addition, as each treaty was signed, the annual stipend paid to the tribe by 
the U.S. went up.  This was supposed to be for the use of the whole tribe in pursuit of 
“civilization” but it was increasingly mismanaged and came to be viewed by most Creeks 
as little more than a bribe paid to their corrupt leaders.147   
 After 1805, there were few land cessions of any significance until after the close 
of the War of 1812.  In the coming years, the Creek National Council would be 
challenged by a nativist faction of the tribe called the Red Sticks.  Influenced by the pan-
Indian movement of the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa, this group advocated the 
formation of a confederacy of Indian nations and the development of a sustainable 
economic system that benefited the natives.148  This backlash against the National 
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Council shows that there was a significant portion of the Creek tribe that did not respect 
the authority of this body.  Council members were men who had amassed vast wealth 
through “civilized” pursuits like slavery and cattle.  These men viewed this property as 
their own individual estates and passed it down to their sons when they died.149  They had 
attained their prominence through support of Americans like Hawkins and benefitting 
from land cessions, and were therefore easily manipulated by Hawkins and other 
agents.150  It became clear that these leaders represented a minority of Creeks when 
traditionalists among the tribe challenged the authority of this body.  Most Creeks still 
maintained conventional Creek notions of property and law and therefore opposed the 
direction being taken by the “civilized” members of the council.  The factionalism among 
the tribe also illustrated that Hawkins’ assumption that a single body could speak for the 
tribe and that all Creeks would comply with those decisions was erroneous.   
 
 With the Creek confederacy, Benjamin Hawkins astutely manipulated tribal 
government in a way that facilitated Jefferson’s “civilization” program.  The U.S. created 
a Creek National Council and made sure that at least some of the chiefs on the council 
supported American programs.  Jefferson justified this manipulation with the arguments 
of philanthropy.  He argued the more “civilized” chiefs could understand his vision for 
the future of the Indians as civilized workers and farmers in white society, and it was his 
duty to work with these chiefs to save the rest of the tribe from extinction.  Jefferson’s 
actions and aims in diplomacy showed a different goal.  Benjamin Hawkins was sent to 
gain lands on behalf of white settlers.  The state of Georgia put pressure on the 
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government to clear Creek lands, and that is ultimately why Jefferson sought the 
cessions.  Hawkins carried out the negotiations on Jefferson’s behalf, using moral and 
practical arguments crafted to fit his aims.  He asked for cooperation from the tribe for 
mutual friendship and peace and so that whites could better navigate and trade.  In these 
matters, Jefferson conveniently neglected to consider the right to free trade, which he 
considered to be fundamental, with regards to the Creeks.  In fact, even though he used 
this right as a justification to threaten war with France over New Orleans, he had no 
problem economically dominating the Creek nation and intentionally getting them into 
debt so he could manipulate them.  This relationship with the Creeks shows the flexibility 
of Jefferson’s morality in diplomacy and his tendency to pick and choose tactics and 
ideals to fit the situation.   
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Conclusion 
During his presidency, Thomas Jefferson dealt with other nations, European and 
Indian, with a single-minded determination to promote American interests.  He knew that 
in order to be successful, America needed to continue expanding and acquiring resources, 
and needed access to roads and rivers for transportation and trade.  He treated with all of 
his neighbors to these ends, whether white or Indian.  He was an idealist who justified his 
pursuits with complex moral philosophies that differed depending on the situation.  When 
treating with Europeans he appealed to enlightened ideas of the natural rights of states, 
while with Native Americans he used ideas of bringing “civilization.”  In both instances 
he tried to show that what he was doing was in the best interest of all parties and that he 
was morally justified or even morally obligated in his pursuits.  He always argued that he 
wanted peace and friendship but was often willing to forsake these things if it helped get 
what he wanted.  The reason for the striking differences between the two sets of relations 
was Jefferson’s keen understanding of his own resources.  He was willing to bribe and 
manipulate the Native Americans because he could.  He did not have this kind of power 
over European nations, so he resorted to threatening war and alliances with their enemies.   
 The “civilizing” mission was really just a way to organize diplomacy with Indian 
tribes.  It was similar to European diplomacy in its aim to promote American expansion 
and the establishment of a farmer’s republic, but it went farther.  It attempted to reshape 
Native American societies themselves in the image of the United States.  This 
transformation was based on the notion that the U.S. had progressed further towards the 
ideal of “civilization” than the Indians had.  Jefferson had similar ideas of American 
superiority with regards to European aristocracy and monarchical governments.  He tried 
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to “civilize” the Native Americans because it helped fulfill his expansionist aims.  This 
was the ultimate goal of both his Indian policy and his diplomacy.   
 This idea puts forward a new perspective from which to examine Thomas 
Jefferson.  He is remembered for his enlightened ideals and articulation of fundamental 
human liberties, but an examination of his policies suggests that he was above all an 
opportunist.  His arguments for natural rights fit very conveniently with his political 
agenda.  The continuity in his goals and tactics in European and Native American 
interactions combined with the flexibility of his moral justifications shows another side of 
Thomas Jefferson.  This larger picture of Jeffersonian diplomacy emerges when one takes 
into account both his European and Native American policies rather than viewing them as 
completely separate.   
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